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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Recent official reports in the US illustrate that mutual funds’ investment practices become more 
and more subject to financial regulators’ concerns. In 2016, the Financial Stability Report (FSR) 
as well as documents published by Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) raise concerns 
over the role of mutual funds for the stability of the financial system. Most concerns encompass 
liquidity and redemption risk but also risks arising from financial leverage through investments 
in derivatives and other leveraged instruments attract attention (OFR, 2016; FSOC, 2016a, and 
FSOC, 2016b). As a comprehensible consequence, the SEC aims to tighten the regulation on 
mutual funds’ use of derivatives. Thus, the regulator invites researchers to comment on mutual 
funds’ derivatives use and to review existing rules.1 The idea of this procedure is to protect 
private as well as institutional investors and to mitigate any adversarial effects of leveraged 
investments for the financial system as a whole. 
Mutual fund performance and risk have been subject to scientific research for a long time. 
Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) as well as Carhart (1997), among others, develop 
models that have now become state-of-the-art in research. Other important topics in this wide 
research area are, for example, measuring mutual fund timing (e.g. Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; 
Henriksson and Merton, 1981; Busse, 1999; Becker et al., 1999; Jiang et al., 2007; Elton et al., 
2012). Others investigate how certain fund characteristics, for example size or cash, are 
associated with performance and risk (Chen et al. 2004; Pastor et al., 2015; Simutin, 2014). 
With regard to regulators’ concerns, researchers examine the effects of flows into and out of 
mutual funds on performance as documented by Rakowski (2010), Coval and Stafford (2007) 
                                                 
1 https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2011/ic-29776.pdf. 
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or Rohleder et al. (2017). The tenor of this stream of literature is that there is a negative relation 
between both inflows and outflows and the profitability of mutual funds. 
With respect to leverage generating investment practices and their impact on fund performance 
and risk, however, there is no scientific consensus. In the US, the topic becomes particular 
important after the abolishment of the “short-short” rule with the “American taxpayer relief 
act” in 1997. With the repealing of this statute, the use of derivative securities and other leverage 
generating investment practices has grown but only a few studies address this topic. Lynch-
Koski and Pontiff (1999) are the first to examine derivatives use by equity mutual funds in the 
US. They find no clear relation between derivatives and mutual fund performance or risk. Chen 
et al. (2013) document superior manager skill for short selling mutual funds. Evans et al. (2015) 
find underperformance for security lenders. Further work on mutual funds derivative use is 
provided by Cao et al. (2011), Cici and Palacios (2015), and Rohleder et al. (2017) for equity 
funds. The literature regarding this topic in connection with bond funds is much smaller as there 
are only two studies published (Deli and Varma, 2002 and Adam and Guettler, 2015). 
One possible reason for the disaccord of research on mutual fund derivative use could be that 
performance and risk of funds using leverage generating instruments are difficult to measure. 
Many studies address problems and hurdles, which can arise from such investment practices 
(see e.g. Leland, 1999; Lhabitant, 2000, Goetzmann et al., 2007). 
As a result, this dissertation aims to close two research gaps. First, it aims at improving the 
understanding of relations between both equity and bond mutual funds and complex investment 
practices. The second goal is to contribute to the literature on biases in performance and risk 
measures for mutual funds. Chapter II thus answers the question if option use by US domestic 
equity mutual funds is beneficial or harmful for investors and whether SEC’s worries about the 
use of these instruments are justified. Chapter III examines relations between the use of a 
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broader range of complex investment practices by bond mutual funds. The focus of Chapter IV 
lies on the second main goal of this dissertation and reveals a systematic bias in bond fund 
performance measurement that arises from the non-linear relationship between changes in the 
term structure and bond returns, which has been neglected until now. Chapter V reviews the 
performance of option strategy benchmark indices provided by the Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) and uncovers the complexity of different approaches to measuring 
performance and risk of portfolios containing options. The last chapter VI sums up the results 
of this dissertation and gives an understanding of research ideas that might be relevant in the 
future based on the insights provided in this dissertation. The rest of Chapter I ends with the 
following brief summaries of the research articles provided in this dissertation. 
1.2 Overview over papers included 
Paper title Co-authors Published? Journal Date 
The benefits of option use by mutual funds 
Martin Rohleder 
Dominik Schulte 
Marco Wilkens 
Yes 
Journal of Financial 
Intermediation (A), Vol. 
26, pp. 142–1682 
2016 
Bond mutual funds and complex investments 
Martin Rohleder 
Dominik Schulte 
Marco Wilkens 
Yes 
Journal of Asset 
Management (B), 
forthcoming3 
2017 
Duration-adjusted bond fund performance Martin Rohleder Marco Wilkens No
4 WP, University of Augsburg5 2017 
Option-based benchmark indices – A review 
of performance and (in)appropriate measures – Yes 
Journal of Futures Markets 
(B), forthcoming6 2017 
 
1.2.1 Article I – The benefits of option use by mutual funds 
The first article of this dissertation focuses on the performance and risk of mutual funds 
investing in options. Analyzing a sample of 2,576 actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds 
                                                 
2 doi: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.01.002. 
3 doi:10.1057/s41260-017-0046-7. 
4 Accepted at the 4th European Retail Investment Conference 2017, Stuttgart, Germany, the 2017 FMA European 
Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, the World Finance Conference, Sardinia, Italy, and the 79th Annual VHB Meeting, 
St. Gallen, Switzerland for presentation. 
5 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2877630. 
6 doi: 10.1002/fut.21865. 
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and a period from 1999 to the end of 2014, we find that option users among equity funds 
generate higher risk-adjusted performance as well as lower systematic risk compared to their 
non-using peers. Moreover, we show that observed relations of option use and performance as 
well as risk, respectively, are directly attributable to the employment of options and are not 
driven by other fund characteristics. Systematically lower systematic risk is mainly a result of 
hedging efforts, as mutual funds mainly employ protective put and covered call strategies. We 
strengthen our results by controlling for non-linearities in fund returns and skewed return 
distributions with models by Leland (1999), Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) as well as a novel 
investable option-factor approach (IOS) we develop. Various robustness tests indicate that our 
findings are not a result of known anomalies such as the low beta anomaly (Frazzini and 
Pedersen, 2014) or the low volatility anomaly (e.g. Baker et al, 2011) and are devoid of 
endogeneity concerns. Our overall conclusion is that the use of options by mutual funds is 
beneficial for investors and is not harmful for the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
1.2.2 Article II – Bond mutual funds and complex investments 
After dealing with the use of options by equity mutual funds, this paper examines the use of 
complex investments of active US bond mutual funds. We define complex investments as all 
investment practices that are not coercively common among mutual funds such as derivatives 
and practices that generate economic leverage, e.g. short selling or margin purchases. The 
majority of previous research papers analyze complex investment use of equity mutual funds, 
whereas only very few studies examine funds investing in fixed income securities. Looking at 
a sample consisting of 997 active bond mutual funds from 1990 to 2014, we find that complex 
investments are much more common among bond funds than among equity funds. However, it 
seems that most complex investment practices are unrelated to fund performance and risk. Bond 
funds investing in interest rate futures significantly underperform their non-using peers by more 
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than 50 basis point p.a., though. Furthermore, these futures users exhibit higher exposure to the 
term-factor, i.e. they might employ these derivatives to speculate on interest rate changes. 
1.2.3 Article III – Duration-adjusted bond fund performance 
The second main topic in this dissertation is the methods used for performance measurement. 
In particular, this article focuses on systematic and mechanical biases arising when measuring 
the performance of fixed income mutual funds. All previous studies analyzing bond funds 
neglect this topic and thus, the topic is of vital importance. The main finding of this study is 
that the prevailing methods for performance measurement and their implicit assumption of a 
linear relationship between return and time to maturity respectively duration lead to severe and 
systematic biases. At first, we provide theoretical evidence and test our theory on a set of 
passive indices, where we explain the excess return of an index with the excess return of another 
index that has a different effective duration. We can show that the more the two durations differ 
the more severe the bias is in performance measures. In addition, we translate this methodology 
to a sample consisting of 127 actively managed US domestic government bond funds and 291 
active US domestic corporate bond funds in the period from 1990 to 2014. The pattern observed 
with passive bond indices can also be found among bond funds. Since the duration of mutual 
funds is lower than for broad bond indices used in previous research, we can show that 
performance in existing studies is systematically overestimated. Our solution for this duration 
bias in performance measures is to choose a best-fit-benchmark that matches the duration of 
the respective fund as good as possible. In further analyses, we can show that results of previous 
work are at least partly driven by the duration bias. 
1.2.4 Article IV – Option-based benchmark indices – A review of performance and 
(in)appropriate measures. 
The Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) has invented a variety of passive option 
strategy benchmark indices to provide sufficient benchmarks for investors trading options. 
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Many studies attest relatively high returns and lower risk in terms of volatility for these indices 
and thus, find significant outperformance on a risk-adjusted basis. Measuring the performance 
of portfolios containing options, however, is highly complex. Options added to portfolios may 
generate asymmetric return distributions due to their non-linear payoff structures (e.g. Leland, 
1999; Lhabitant, 2000). Skewed returns may lead to positively or negatively biased 
performance measures. Further biases might arise from time-varying betas, which are grounded 
in the self-financing replicating portfolio of options (Black and Scholes, 1973). This study 
employs different approaches to account for these pitfalls by controlling for higher moments, 
allowing time-varying betas and, moreover, develops a novel option straddle-factor model 
inspired by the hedge fund related work of Agarwal and Naik (2004). Although results do not 
change remarkably by controlling for these shortcomings, it is nevertheless possible that 
performance measures are biased. This is the first study that examines performance and risk for 
many different option strategy benchmark indices simultaneously. An interesting finding of this 
article is that outperformance found by previous studies is driven by past times and limited 
sample periods. A possible reason for the diminishing performance over time might be falsely 
priced options as documented by Constantinides et al. (2009) as well as Chambers et al (2014). 
In addition to analyses on raw data of option strategies, the profitability of direct investments 
in one of the strategy indices via an Exchange Traded Fund and an Exchange Traded Note is 
examined. The conclusion that the reader can draw from this analysis is that potential benefits 
of option strategies are consumed by the cost investment providers charge, as the investment 
products underperform their underlying by up to almost one percentage point p.a. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we uncover a previously neglected mechanical bias in measured bond fund 
performance caused by the use of benchmark indices which do not match the durations of the 
funds. This “duration bias” emerges because the non-linear reaction of bonds with different 
durations to changes of the term structure is not adequately recognized by the usual regression 
based performance models. This finding is of vital importance because the usual practice of 
using a broad market index leads to a significant overestimation of average bond fund 
performance as the durations of bond funds are shorter on average than the durations of those 
broad market indices. Further, this mechanical bias explains at least partly the consistent finding 
of performance persistence or “hot hands” in bond funds. The key takeaway of our paper is thus 
that bond fund performance should be measured in a consistent, duration-adjusted way by 
choosing for each fund the benchmark index which best matches the duration of the fund.  
Ever since Jensen (1968), the dominant approach to measuring the risk-adjusted 
performance of mutual funds has been to relate fund returns linearly to the returns of one or 
multiple passive benchmark factors via OLS regression and interpret the constant α as the value 
added by active management. For equity funds, this approach is theoretically grounded on the 
CAPM by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) where the expected return of a 
stock is linearly linked to the expected return of the efficient equity market portfolio. An equity 
fund’s systematic market risk is thus measured by its sensitivity beta with which any security 
can be linearly scaled up and down the equity security market line (SML).  
For bonds, already early work by Macaulay (1938) shows that the duration D may be 
interpreted as a measure of a bond’s sensitivity towards systematic term-risk, i.e. the risk of an 
instantaneous bond price change dPi,t/Pi,t due to a change of the interest rate r at time t (e.g., 
Hopewell and Kaufman, 1973). 
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dPi,t
Pi,t
= –Di,t dri,t(1+r)  
Combining both approaches – the linear market model and the interpretation of duration as a 
bond’s sensitivity to term-risk – Boquist et al. (1975) argue for default-free bonds that beta is a 
linear function of duration. Jarrow (1978) extends this relation to bonds with default risk.7 
βi,t= –Di,t
 Cov(dri,t, Rm,t)
Var(Rm,t)
 
 
Consequentially, when bond fund performance research took off in the early 1990s with the 
studies by Cornell and Green (1991), Blake et al. (1993) and Elton et al. (1995), these studies 
adopted the linear market model approach from equity fund studies to explain the returns of 
bond funds with those of broad (Treasury) bond market indices. The implicit assumption is that 
a bond fund’s systematic term risk can be linearly scaled up and down the “bond SML” using 
the beta.8 Distinct advantages of adopting this already established methodology are that the 
results may be conveniently interpreted in the usual way and that the regression models allow 
a straightforward incorporation of further relevant risk factors such as, e.g., default risk, option 
related risk, equity-related risk or illiquidity risk. 
However, the underlying assumption of linearity in term-risk may be only made for a 
parallel shift of a flat yield curve while the shape of the term structure, as well as changes 
thereof, are usually more complicated than that (e.g., Cox et al., 1979). In this context, Dietz et 
al. (1981) show via cross-sectional regressions that the return duration relationship in the US 
government bond market is, in fact, non-linear. To confirm and illustrate this non-linearity, we 
present different example term structure scenarios from a sensitivity analysis which is based on 
                                                 
7 The parameter D in Jarrow (1978) is an approximation of Macaulay’s duration. 
8 More recent examples of studies using this approach are, e.g., Huij and Derwall (2008), Gutierrez et al. (2009) 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013), and Chen and Qin (2016). 
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the proposition by Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) that level, slope and curvature sufficiently 
describe the shape of the term structure.  
As a consequence, our primary research hypothesis is, that the usual approach of relating 
the returns of all bond funds linearly to those of the same broad (Treasury) bond market index 
to measure the term risk of funds will lead to a systematic bias in measured performance, if the 
average duration of the index does not match the average durations of the funds. We term this 
bias the “duration bias” and propose the usage of a “duration-adjusted benchmark model” which 
merely identifies and uses for each bond fund the one index from a set of alternative indices 
with the closest proximity in duration. This approach solves the duration bias problem while at 
the same time maintaining the above advantages of the usual regression models. 
To test our hypothesis of a significant duration bias we employ a broad range of 
empirical tests. First, using ten US Treasury indices with focuses on different maturity ranges 
in the period from 1990 to 2014, we find statistically significant and positive duration biases if 
the benchmark indices’ durations are too long and statistically significant and negative duration 
biases if the benchmark indices’ durations are too short. Second, using monthly information on 
the average durations of 127 active US domestic government bond funds and 291 corporate 
bond funds, as well as information on the monthly durations of the ten US Treasury indices, we 
show a similar duration bias pattern in bond fund performance. Third, we show that this overall 
pattern is especially pronounced during months with a widening term-spread and reversed 
during months with a contracting term-spread. The reversal behavior is especially relevant 
during the build-up periods to the two economic crises during our sample period, consistent 
with the usual interpretation of an inverted term structure as a predictor of an upcoming 
recession (e.g., Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). 
Important implications of these findings are, first, that the average duration of the 
government and corporate bond funds in both our samples is approximately four years while 
17 
the duration of the broad Treasury index is close to 5.5 years. This disparity suggests a 
significant and systematic overestimation of the average measured bond fund performance in 
previous studies usually using a broad (Treasury) bond market index. Second, via panel 
regressions, we show that alpha performance using the usual broad index is significantly driven 
by term structure changes and thus a biased measure of managers’ selection performance. Our 
duration-adjusted alpha, however, is unrelated to term structure changes and hence unbiased. 
Third, we find that the consistent finding of performance persistence in bond funds is at least 
partly driven by the systematic overestimation of shorter-term funds and the systematic 
underestimation of longer-term funds due to the duration bias and not due to “hot hands.” This 
is especially true for government bond funds where empirical tests show no persistence after 
controlling for the duration-adjusted benchmark. Fourth, by analyzing the names of bond funds’ 
self-stated prospectus benchmark indices, we find that the majority of funds provide dependable 
information regarding the average maturity range of their portfolio holdings. This raises the 
question why previous research has not used this information in bond fund performance 
measurement. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 presents a sensitivity analysis to illustrate 
the non-linear relationship between the returns of bonds with different durations. Section 4.3 
presents a bond index based analysis of the duration bias. Section 4.4 tests the duration bias in 
government and corporate bond funds. Section 4.5 tests if our duration-adjusted model yields 
unbiased estimates of fund performance. Section 4.6 presents further implications of our 
findings for prior and future bond fund research, specifically on the persistence in bond fund 
performance and on the information content of bond funds’ prospectus benchmarks. Section 
4.7 concludes.  
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
This section shows a sensitivity analysis based on the proposition by, e.g., Litterman and 
Scheinkman (1991) that three common factors – economically interpreted as level L, slope S 
and curvature C – are sufficient to characterize the shape of the term-structure to illustrate the 
non-linear relation between the returns of bonds with different durations. For our analysis, we 
modify the term structure model used by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
1991) via canonical variable transformation. As a result, Eq. (1) relates the internal rate of return 
rT on bonds with maturity in T to the three common factors which we define as follows: level 
L = r1, slope S = (r10 – r1) / 9 and curvature C = r5  – r1  – 4 S.9 
rT = L + S (T – 1) + C (0.436542 – 0.436542 T + 1.70629 ln T) (1) 
Compared to other term structure models like, e.g., the Nelson and Siegel (1987) function, Eq. 
(1) has the advantage that it conveniently allows analyzing isolated changes in all three common 
factors. This is an important feature for the sensitivity analysis presented in this section as well 
as in further analyses presented in section 5.  
Based on our term structure model, we generate the spot rates of twenty zero-bonds with 
integer maturities in T = 1–20 years for a basic setup where L = 1.0%, S = 0.5%, and  
C = 0.75%. Using these spot rates, we calculate the respective zero-bond prices PT = 1 / (1 + 
rT)T. Then, we assume different changes of the term-structure as isolated or combined changes 
of the level (dL), slope (dS) and curvature (dC) and calculate the instantaneous returns  
RT = dPT/PT of the twenty zero-bonds. Figure 1 presents six selected example scenarios for 
term-structure changes (left plots) and the corresponding zero-bond returns (right plots, solid 
                                                 
9 This modification is based on Wilkens (1994). For details on the derivation, see Appendix A. 
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lines) as well as the linear approximation of the returns using the zero-bonds with maturities in 
T = 1 and T = 10 years (right plots, dotted lines).10 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
The plots for all example scenarios show that the relation between the returns of bonds with 
different durations is clearly non-linear so that linear approximations lead to serious over- and 
underestimations of bond returns. Even for isolated level shifts as presented in Scenario (i), the 
relation is not perfectly linear and thus may cause a systematic over- or underestimation of bond 
returns via linear approximation in extreme cases. For some term-structure changes like the one 
presented in scenario (vi) where a level increase is combined with a decrease in slope and 
curvature, the return relation for bonds with different durations may take extreme non-linear 
shapes. This scenario presents a rather usual case because central bank decisions change short-
term interest rates very quickly, but transmission to long-term rates takes time. In that scenario, 
the linear approximation using the 10-year zero-bond leads to a clear overestimation of the 
returns of all zero-bonds with term-to-maturity of 2–9 years and to a clear underestimation of 
the returns on all zero-bonds with term-to-maturity of above 10 years. Thus, we consider our 
hypothesis warranted that the use of bond market indices which do not match the duration of 
the analyzed bond fund might lead to a significant duration-bias. 
4.3 Treasury bond index analysis 
4.3.1 Data 
Before directly testing our hypothesis of a significant duration bias using bond funds, we first 
want to test the hypothesis in an empirical setting where we have complete control over the 
                                                 
10 The implementation of this simulation in MS Excel is straightforward. However, we are happy to provide further 
example scenarios upon request. See also spot rates and bond prices for the basic term-structure and scenario (iii) 
in Appendix B. 
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alpha generated by active management.11 To do so, we use ten Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
(BofAML) US Treasury bond total return indices focusing on different maturity ranges. Using 
Treasury indices has the further advantage that they allow analyzing term risk effects 
exclusively without distractions by other bond related risks like, e.g., default risk.12 We obtain 
monthly returns of the Treasury indices in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 from 
Morningstar Direct and monthly statistics on their average quality and average effective 
duration in the period 01/1997 to 12/2014 from the BofAML Global Index System.13 
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics on quality and durations of the indices. 
All Treasury indices are rated AAA. The numbers for durations show that the indices cover a 
broad range of different durations. Moreover, the durations of most of the indices display 
relatively small variation. Also, the short-term indices are especially distinctive as minimum 
and maximum durations of adjacent indices show small overlap. The broad Treasury index, 
which is used in many studies to approximate term-risk, is situated between the indices focusing 
on maturity ranges from 5–7 and 5–10 years. Panel B shows average durations in non-
overlapping 3-year sub-periods. The durations of all indices display an upward trend over time 
as could be expected by the decreasing nominal interest rates during this period, especially since 
the financial crisis in 2008.  
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
                                                 
11 Other studies like, e.g., Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) use different bootstrapping 
techniques for this purpose. 
12 Alternative analyses using BofAML investment grade corporate bond and government/corporate bond indices 
with different maturity ranges lead to similar findings. They are available upon request. 
13 http://www.mlindex.ml.com/gispublic/bin/MLIndex.asp#. Data regarding quality and duration of the indices 
before 1997 is not available via the homepage. 
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In addition to these indices, we also use a term factor – the return difference between a long-
term index (10+ years) and a short-term index (1–3 years). Such a factor is used in many studies 
to capture term risk in the returns of bonds or bond funds (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; 
Bessembinder et al., 2008; Amihud and Goyenko, 2013). 
4.3.2 Duration bias in Treasury bond index performance 
4.3.2.1 Overall period 
To test the duration bias in Treasury bond index measurement in the overall period from 
01/1990 to 12/2014, we run pairwise time series regressions of each index against all other 
indices following Eq. (2): 
ertreasury d,t = αd +βd, treasury erttreasury D≠d+ εd,t  (2) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 is the return of Treasury index with duration d in month t in excess of the 
risk free rate (1m T-bill), ert
treasury D≠d is the excess return of a Treasury index with another 
duration (D ≠ d ), αd represents index d’s mean abnormal return, βd,treasury is the sensitivity of 
index d’s returns to the returns of the Treasury index and εdt is an error term with  
E(εdt) = 0. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows regression alphas such that the columns show the dependent 
index and the rows show the benchmark indices. The results clearly show the existence of a 
statistically and economically significant duration bias. All alphas below the diagonal are 
positive indicating that the use of an index with a longer than adequate duration leads to a 
positive alpha, respectively duration bias, i.e. an overestimation of performance. At the same 
time, all alphas above the diagonal are negative indicating that the use of an index with shorter 
than adequate duration leads to a negative duration bias, i.e. an underestimation of performance. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
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Further, the two bottom rows of Panel A show regressions against the broad Treasury index and 
the term factor. As expected, the duration bias is smallest for the index with maturity range 5–
10. All shorter indices show a significantly positive alpha and those above show a negative 
alpha. More astonishingly, however, the term factor leads to a positive, very high and 
statistically significant alpha independent of the respective index’s duration. Thus, we conclude 
that the use of a long-minus-short term-factor has critical drawbacks compared to using long-
only benchmark indices. 
4.3.2.2 Distinguishing different market climates 
For the overall period from 1990 to 2014, the previous section shows a significantly positive 
duration bias if short-term indices are benchmarked against long-term indices and vice versa. 
However, it is ex-ante unclear whether this pattern will hold in the future since our sample 
period can be characterized by an exceptional overall decrease of the interest rate level as 
documented by Panel A of Figure 2. To test if the direction of the duration bias depends on the 
bond market climate, we perform our pairwise index regressions during different level-
independent market phases for which different duration biases may be expected. Specifically, 
we use the slope of the term structure, the spread between the yields of 10 years and 1 year 
Treasury bonds, to split the sample period into those months exhibiting widening and 
contracting term-spreads.14 This separation leads to slightly more observations with a widening 
than a contracting term-spread as shown in Table 3. 
 [Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 here.] 
During phases of a widening term spread, usually associated with a more positive or “normal” 
term structure and improving economic conditions (e.g., Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991), we 
                                                 
14 Daily yield curve data are obtained from the US Department of the Treasury (https://www.Treasury.gov) and 
aggregated to the monthly frequency using averages. 
23 
expect to find a similar pattern as in the overall period. Scenario (ii) of Figure 1 illustrates this 
expectation. Here, longer-term bonds underestimate the returns on shorter-term bonds resulting 
in a positive alpha, and shorter-term bonds overestimate the returns on longer-term bonds 
resulting in a negative alpha. Consistent with this intuition, Table 3 reports for widening term-
spreads that short-term bonds have distinctively higher returns than long-term bonds. Moreover, 
Panel B of Table 2 shows pairwise index regressions exclusively using months with a widening 
term spread. The results confirm our expectation by showing the pattern very clearly with 
positive and significant duration biases below the diagonal and negative, significant and high 
duration biases above the diagonal. 
Conversely, during phases of a contracting term spread, usually associated with a 
flattening or reversing term structure and worsening economic conditions (e.g., Estrella and 
Hardouvelis, 1991), we expect to find a reversed pattern. Scenario (iii) of Figure 1 illustrates 
this expectation. Here, longer-term bonds overestimate the returns on shorter-term bonds 
resulting in a negative alpha, and shorter-term bonds underestimate the returns on longer-term 
bonds resulting in a positive alpha. Consistent with this intuition, short-term bonds in Table 3 
show distinctively lower returns than long-term bonds. Panel C of Table 2 shows the results of 
pairwise index regressions which confirm our expectation by showing the reversed pattern very 
clearly with negative and partly significant duration biases below the diagonal and positive, 
significant and high duration biases above the diagonal.  
Regarding the duration biases with respect to the broad index and the term factor during 
both market phases, we again find that the broad index behaves like the 5–10 years index during 
both market phases. For the term factor, Panel B shows positive, very high and statistically 
significant alphas for all indices during months with a widening spread. During phases of a 
contracting spread, Panel C still shows positive but insignificant duration biases. This augments 
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our previous conclusion that the term factor is inadequate as a benchmark for bond indices of 
all durations and that it is also inadequate during both market climates.  
4.3.2.3 Rolling window analysis 
In the previous section, we show that the duration bias has different signs during different very 
ideal bond market climates. However, the month-by-month separation of the sub-samples with 
widening and contracting term spreads is rather artificial as shown in Panel B of Figure 2 and 
may have only limited real implications. To test if the implications of the previous subsection 
are also economically relevant, we analyze the development of the duration bias over time using 
a monthly rolling 5-year window approach.15  
Figure 3 plots the duration bias over time. In Panel A, the dependent index with the 
maturity range of 1–3 years is benchmarked against all other indices with longer maturity 
ranges. As expected from the results displayed in Panel A of Table 2, the figure shows positive 
duration biases for most of the windows as well as increasing biases with increasing benchmark 
durations. However, the plots also show that the duration bias is not constant through time. 
Specifically, during the build-up of the tech bubble in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
duration bias becomes almost zero. Even more dramatically, during the build-up of the financial 
crisis before 2008, the duration bias becomes negative, displaying the pattern known from Panel 
C of Table 2. Overall, this is consistent with the interpretation of a flattening or inverting term-
structure as a strong predictor of an upcoming economic recession shown in previous studies 
(e.g., Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). 
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
Panel B of the figure shows similar plots for the dependent index with a maturity range of 5–
10 years benchmarked against all other indices. As expected, all indices with shorter durations 
                                                 
15 A similar analysis using monthly rolling 3-year windows yields economically similar results. 
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show on average negative duration biases while those with longer durations show on average 
positive biases. Consistent with Panel A, the patterns flatten or reverse during the build-ups to 
the two economic crises occurring during our sample period. Moreover, the broad Treasury 
index shows an almost zero duration bias over time due to its proximity to the 5–10 years index. 
Finally, Panel C displays plots for the dependent index with the maturity range of 10+ years 
benchmarked against all other indices.16 As expected, the plots show on average negative 
duration biases against all indices (except for the term factor) as well as the same phases with 
flattening or reversing biases. 
Overall, we can thus conclude that the separation of the overall period into different 
market climates makes sense not only in theory but also in practice. Deviating from the global 
pattern shown in Panel A of Table 2, there are phases where a flattened or even reversed 
duration bias pattern emerges. These phases are economically linked to the build-up of financial 
and economic crises, consistent with a flattening or inverting of the term-structure. 
4.3.3 Elton, Gruber and Nabar (1988) 
In this subsection, we use another approach to demonstrate the existence of a significant 
duration bias in a more theoretical way. Therefore, we refer to the study by Elton et al. (1988) 
who derive their first return generating process, the single-factor duration model “Dur-1”, from 
the assumption that the price change of a bond due to a random interest rate shock can be 
expressed as in Eq. (3): 
P�i,t+1– P�i,t+1
P�i,t+1
= –Di,t+1 ∆t+11+r (3) 
                                                 
16 Further panels for the remaining indices show the expected patterns and are available upon request. 
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where P�i,t+1 is the actual (but unknown) price of bond i at time t+1, P�i,t+1 is the expected price, 
∆t+1 is the interest rate shock and r is the interest rate before the shock. From this relation, the 
authors derive the Dur-1 model as:17 
(Ri,t – Rf,t) = Di,tDp,t �Rp,t – Rf,t�+ei,t (4) 
where Ri,t is the return of bond i in period t, Dp,t is the duration of an arbitrary diversified bond 
portfolio p and Rp,t is that portfolio’s return.  
The critical parameter in Eq. (4) is ei,t. It captures the pricing error which, according to 
the authors, is independent and zero on average. However, given the non-linearity of the price 
reaction to interest rate shocks for bonds with different durations illustrated by our sensitivity 
analysis in Section 4.2, we argue that ei,t depends systematically on the discrepancy between 
Di and Dp and may, therefore, be non-zero on average. For example, take a look at Scenario 
(ii) of Figure 1, where portfolio p is the zero-bond with maturity in 10 years, and the risk-free 
asset is the zero-bond with maturity in 1 year. Now, if 1 < Di,t < 10 the expected pricing error 
will be positive and if Di,t > 10 the expected pricing error will be negative. 
Thus, we apply model Dur-1 as given in Eq. (4) to the ten Treasury indices used in the 
previous subsections. Therefore, we first calculate the duration ratios Di,t/Dp,t for all index pairs 
Di,t ≠ Dp,t in every month t. Then, we calculate the monthly expected index excess returns and 
subtract them from the actual index returns to arrive at time-series of pricing errors for all index 
pairs. Table 4 shows t-tests against the Null that the pairwise pricing errors are zero on average. 
Panel A reports the results for the overall period from 1990 to 2014.18 The patterns displayed 
                                                 
17 The exact notation used in the paper is Ri = R30+ DiDp �Rp– R30�+ei where R30 is the return on the 30-day T-bill. 
For details on the derivation of Dur-1, see Elton et al. (1988), p. 130-132. 
18 An additional panel for the period from 1997 to 2014 shows economically similar results and is available upon 
request. 
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in the table are similar to those displayed for the pairwise index regressions in Panel A of Table 
2 in that the average pricing errors below the diagonal are positive and in many cases 
statistically significant for benchmark indices with too long durations. Further, the pricing 
errors are negative on average and in many cases statistically significant above the diagonal for 
benchmark indices with too short durations.  
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
Moreover, consistent with the relations illustrated in Figure 1 where the difference between the 
zero-bond returns and the linear approximation are larger if we approximate a longer index with 
a too short one, the average pricing errors are larger above the diagonal. This is even more 
pronounced in Panels B and C which show results for widening and contracting term spreads 
in the period from 1990 to 2014, thereby further strengthening our hypothesis of a significant 
duration bias in bond mutual fund performance. 
For a possible explanation why the Dur-1 model of Elton et al. (1988) leads to non-zero 
average pricing errors if Di ≠ Dp we once again refer to the works of Hopewell and Kaufman 
(1973) and Boquist et al. (1975). They define the instantaneous return of a bond i in reaction to 
a change in the term-structure as in Eq. (5) where the second term on the right-hand side is 
termed the “change in yield-to-maturity.” 
dPi,t
Pi,t
 = –Di,t dri,t(1+r) (5) 
However, as Figure 1 shows, the change in the spot rates of the zero-bonds due to changes of 
the term-structure clearly depend on the respective term to maturity and are thus specific to 
each zero-bond (except for isolated level changes). Thus, acknowledging that ∆t+1 in Eq. (3) 
should actually be bond specific ∆i,t+1, the derivation of Dur-1 as presented in Elton et al. (1988) 
does not work out. 
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4.4 Bond fund analysis 
4.4.1 Data description and duration-adjusted benchmark definition 
For our bond fund analysis, we obtain mutual fund data from two different databases, CRSP 
and Morningstar, which we match following Pastor et al. (2015) and Berk and van Binsbergen 
(2015). From the CRSP database, we select two groups of mutual funds reporting on average 
more than 50% holdings in either government bonds or corporate bonds and exclude from those 
all funds having in either database an objective class other than “US government bond” or “US 
corporate bond,” respectively. Further, we exclude all passive funds by analyzing the funds’ 
names. We obtain monthly returns, monthly total net assets (TNA) and information on further 
fund characteristics like, e.g., turnover, expenses, and age from CRSP. From monthly TNA, we 
calculate monthly implied net flows following Sirri and Tuffano (1998). From Morningstar, we 
obtain monthly information on average holdings durations. We aggregate share-class 
information on fund level using the match provided by Morningstar. Excluding all funds with 
incomplete information or less than 12 monthly observations once they surpass the threshold 
TNA of 5 million USD (e.g., Fama and French, 2010) leaves us with samples of 127 active US 
domestic government bond funds and 291 active US domestic corporate bond funds in the 
sample period from 01/1990 to 12/2014. 
Table 5 reports detailed summary statistics on fund characteristics for all funds with 
Panels A and B showing figures for government bond funds and corporate bond funds 
separately. The average effective duration of government (corporate) bond funds is 4.12 (4.09) 
years which is rather low compared to the average duration of the broad Treasury index of 5.44 
years reported in Table 1. We attribute this disparity to the fact that bonds with long durations 
are predominantly held by insurance companies and pension funds due to their rather long-term 
investment horizons. Thus, broad bond market indices cannot reflect the average duration 
structure of bond funds. Further, the average fund characteristics like TNA, age, turnover, 
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expense ratio and flow are in line with previous research (e.g., Comer and Rodriguez, 2013). 
Finally, many of the government bond funds in our sample have considerable holdings in 
corporate bonds and vice versa, indicating the necessity of incorporating respective additional 
risk factors in the performance models. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
For each of these funds, we identify the duration-adjusted benchmark by the minimum gap 
between the fund’s and the Treasury index’s average holdings duration during the fund’s 
existence within our sample period.19  
4.4.2 Performance measures 
To measure bond fund performance, we use several regression models of which the most basic 
one uses only a single Treasury index or factor to explain government bond returns. Eq. (6) 
represents the SF-model: 
eri,t= αiSF+ βi, treasurySF  erttreasury D+ εi,t  (6) 
Where eri,t represents fund i’s return in month t in excess of the risk-free rate, ert
treasury D 
represents the excess return of a Treasury index with duration D, αiSFrepresents fund i’s mean 
abnormal return, βi,treasury
SF  is the sensitivity of fund i’s returns to the returns of the Treasury 
index and εi,t is an error term with E(εi,t) = 0. 
Because the bond funds in our sample also have considerable holdings in asset classes 
other than government bonds as shown in Table 5, we augment the regression model to capture 
                                                 
19 Information regarding the average durations of the US Treasury indices is available beginning in 1997. As the 
variation in average duration over time is rather low as shown in Table 1, we use the average holdings duration 
reported for each index in 01/1997 as the best estimate for the average holdings duration in the period from 01/1990 
to 12/1996. 
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other systematic risks. Thus, model MF1 (Eq. 7) additionally includes a default factor deft 
which is constructed as the return of a BofAML high yield index minus the return of an 
intermediate term Treasury index (5–7y). This model is used by, e.g., Gutierrez et al. (2009) 
and Huij and Derwall (2008). 
eri,t= αiMF1+ βi,treasuryMF1  erttreasury D+ βi, defMF1  deft+ εi,t  (7) 
In addition to investing in bonds with considerable default risk, government bond funds may 
also invest in mortgage-backed securities which have non-linear, option-like features. Thus, in 
model MF2 (Eq. 8), we include the return of a high yield index, erhy, t, and the return of a 
mortgage-backed bond index, ergnma30, t, in addition to the Treasury index. This model is used 
by, e.g., Huij and Derwall (2008). 
eri,t= αiMF2+ βi,treasuryMF2  ertreasury,tD + βi,hyMF2 erhy,t+ βi,gnmaMF2  ergmna30,t+ εi,t  (8) 
Further augmenting the multi-factor models to capture also equity holdings of government bond 
funds, MF3 (Eq. 9) includes the default factor, the mortgage-backed security index and the 
CRSP value-weighted stock index in addition to the Treasury index. 
eri,t= αiMF3+ βi, treasuryMF3  ertreasury,tD + βi, defMF3  deft+βi,gnmaMF3  ergmna30,t 
                        +βi,mktMF3 ermkt,t + εi,t  
(9) 
Our final model MF4 (Eq. 10) captures the same risks as model MF3, however, instead of the 
mortgage-backed security index, we use an option factor optiont which is constructed as the 
GNMA index minus an intermediate-term US Treasury index. 
eri,t= αiMF4+ βi,treasuryMF4  ertreasury,tD  + βi,defMF4 deft+ βi, optionMF4  optiont 
                        + βi,mktMF4 ermkt,t+ εi,t  
(10) 
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4.4.3 Government bond funds 
4.4.3.1 Average performance 
Table 6 shows average alpha estimates aggregated over all government bond funds and 
benchmarked separately against all ten US Treasury indices, against the term factor as well as 
against the funds’ individually identified duration-adjusted benchmark. Panel A shows results 
for net returns in the overall sample period, while Panel B shows similar results using gross 
returns. The first interesting finding is that the average alpha of the funds in our sample 
increases with the duration of the benchmark index used with, e.g., αiSF in Panel A increasing 
almost monotonically from -0.3290% p.a. using the 1–3 index as the benchmark to 0.4981% 
p.a. using the 10+ index. This is in line with our index based findings. Further, the average 
alpha using the broad index is similar to performance measured using the 5–10 index and the 
term factor produces the highest average alpha; both results are also in line with our index based 
analysis. The duration-adjusted average alpha with -0.1053% p.a. is below the average alpha 
measured using the broad index, which is in line with the majority of funds having average 
durations below that of the broad index which means that using the broad index for all funds 
systematically overestimates average government bond fund performance. 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
Comparing the different factor models reveals that the SF model likely does not capture all 
relevant risks in government bond fund performance because the average alphas generated by 
the MF models are distinctively lower with duration-adjusted performance around -1.1% p.a. 
In the case of the MF4 model, government bond fund performance is significantly negative 
using all Treasury indices, which is in line with the overall finding that on average active 
management does not add value for investors. The only exception is the average alpha using 
the term factor, which is significantly positive; another indication of the problems caused by 
using a term factor. 
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Comparing the results for net returns in Panel A with those for gross returns in Panel B 
reveals that, while the average gross alpha using the broad index is only slightly negative and 
statistically insignificant, the average gross duration-adjusted alpha is significantly negative 
with -0.3724% p.a. indicating that government bond funds do not even earn the fees they 
charge. This is in contrast to numerous findings on equity funds which show that average gross 
performance is zero on average (e.g., Sharpe, 1991; Fama and French, 2010). 
About different market phases, Panels C and D show average government bond alphas 
using net returns during months with widening and contracting term spreads, respectively. The 
relations are in line with our index based analysis. Panel C shows that average alpha increases 
with higher benchmark duration while Panel D shows decreasing alpha with higher benchmark 
duration. Further, the differences between the average alphas using different indices are much 
higher, thereby creating even clearer patterns in both panels compared to Panel A. Regarding 
the average performance during both periods, the results using the duration-adjusted benchmark 
indicate that average performance during phases with widening term spread is much lower than 
the average performance during phases with contracting term spread. Moreover, this difference 
is more pronounced for the duration-adjusted alpha than for the broad Treasury alpha. This is 
consistent with the overall impression in Table 3 that bond returns are lower during phases of 
widening term-spread compared to phases with a contracting term-spread. 
4.4.3.2 Duration bias in government bond fund performance 
The results in the previous subsection on the average alpha performance of all funds show that 
there is a duration bias in government bond fund performance. To get into more detail on the 
magnitude and significance of the bias, Table 7 shows the results of an analysis similar to our 
pairwise Treasury index regressions presented in Table 2. Therefore, we sort all funds into 
groups according to their duration-adjusted benchmark. Then, for each group with at least five 
funds, we perform paired mean-comparison t-tests between the funds’ duration-adjusted MF4-
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model alphas and the MF4-model alphas using the other nine Treasury indices.20 The figures 
represent the average alpha differences, i.e. duration-biases, for each duration group with 
respect to each Treasury index.  
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Panel A shows results for the overall period while Panels B and C show results for the different 
market phases. Overall, the relations are as expected so that in Panels A and B using an index 
with a higher than appropriate duration leads to a positive duration bias while using a shorter 
than appropriate one leads to a negative duration bias. Panel C shows the reversed relation for 
market phases with contracting yield spread, consistent with our index based analysis in Table 
2. Regarding the magnitude of the bias in different fund groups, we primarily look at the results 
for the broad Treasury index. While the bias decreases from left to right with growing bond 
fund duration, it is positive and significant for the first four groups which cover 96 of the total 
127 funds in our sample (75.6%). This explains why the overall duration-adjusted performance 
in Table 6 is slightly lower than the alpha using the broad index as a benchmark.  
Regarding single groups, the average duration-bias in Panel A may be as high as 
0.5520% p.a. for the 24 funds sorted in group 1–3 which is clearly of economic relevance. 
During phases of widening term spreads in Panel B, the duration bias of group 1–3 increases to 
1.4663% p.a. while the largest duration bias during phases of contracting term-spread is 
reported in Panel C for the group 1–5 with -0.6104% p.a. Thus, depending on the market phase, 
using an index with an inappropriate duration as benchmark leads to economically significant 
duration-bias, consistent with our main research hypothesis. 
                                                 
20 Results for the SF- and the other MF-models are economically similar and available upon request. The same 
applies to results based on gross returns. 
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4.4.4 Corporate bond funds 
Given that the Treasury indices we use capture only term-structure risk, we do not use the SF-
model for corporate bond funds. Moreover, as Table 6 shows, the results for the MF-models 
are relatively similar we exclusively use MF4 (Eq. 6) in our corporate bond fund analysis.21 
Table 8 reports average alphas of all funds against all Treasury bond indices as well as against 
the term factor and the duration-adjusted benchmark. For net returns in the overall period, Panel 
A shows the usual pattern of increasing alpha with increasing index duration. Performance 
measured using the broad index is between the performance using the 5–7 and the 5–10 indices 
as expected and the highest alpha is displayed for the term factor. The duration-adjusted alpha 
is below the broad index alpha indicating a general overestimation of corporate bond funds 
performance in previous research. Compared to government bond funds, the average 
performance of corporate bond funds is higher. Panel B reports average gross alphas. As 
expected, the results are higher leading to a significantly positive average duration-adjusted 
alpha of 0.5015% p.a. 
[Insert Table 8 here.] 
Panels C and D report corporate bond fund performance results separately for different market 
phases. Generally, the results show the same patterns like government bond funds in that the 
overall pattern is pronounced in times of a widening term-spread and reverted in times of a 
contracting term-spread. However, the differences are much smaller than displayed for 
government bond funds, especially in Panel D. The duration-adjusted alpha is more or less the 
same during both market phases. However, the alpha using the broad index is very high for a 
widening term spread and low during periods with contracting term-spread causing false 
interpretations regarding the average performance during both phases. 
                                                 
21 Similar analyses using the other MF-models yield economically similar results and are available upon request.  
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For a deeper insight into the relevance and the significance of the duration bias of single 
funds, Table 9 shows the duration bias for all duration-groups with at least five funds. The 
patterns in Panels A and B for the overall period and phases with a widening term-spread are 
as expected. The patterns in Panel C for phases with a contracting term-spread are again less 
pronounced and less clear compared to government bond funds, especially below the diagonal. 
Looking at the most important duration bias between the duration-adjusted alpha and the broad 
index, Panel A shows significantly positive bias estimates for four of five groups which 
represent 253 of 291 funds (86.9%). This explains the overall positive duration bias. However, 
the bias for the single groups is not as high as for government bond funds with the highest 
overall bias displayed for the 5–7 group with 0.3063% p.a. Still, we consider a bias of this 
magnitude as economically important. During different market phases, the duration bias in 
corporate bond fund performance can be as high (low) as 1.3750% p.a. for the 1–5 group in 
Panel B and -0.5294% p.a. for the 1–3 group in Panel C. This also confirms the existence of an 
economically relevant duration bias in corporate bond fund performance and further promotes 
the necessity of using the duration-adjusted benchmark approach. 
[Insert Table 9 here.] 
4.5 Justification of the duration-adjusted performance model 
In the previous sections, we show that the alpha performance of bond funds depends on the 
duration of the benchmark index. This creates a significant duration bias which we define as 
the difference between our duration-adjusted alpha and any alpha using an inappropriate index. 
However, the identification of the duration-adjusted benchmark as the one with the closest 
duration to that of the fund is more or less heuristic. Whether our model itself yields unbiased 
measures of selection performance, is thus unclear. 
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Therefore, we run pooled panel regressions with two-dimensionally clustered standard 
errors (Petersen, 2009) where we explain alphas from the broad Treasury index and the 
duration-adjusted benchmark with changes of the term-structure.22 Thus, we first estimate bond 
fund alphas in overlapping 12-month rolling windows using the SF and the MF4-models. For 
the same 12-month windows, we calculate changes of the level (dL), slope (dS) and curvature 
(dC), where L, S, and C are defined as in the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.2. Further, sign 
and magnitude of the duration bias in different market phases depend on the duration gap 
between the benchmark and the fund, as our previous results show. Therefore, we use 
interactions of the term structure changes with the average duration gap (DG) between the index 
and the fund during the 12-month window. Finally, because these interaction variables are 
highly correlated we also construct orthogonalized variables following the democratic, 
simultaneous orthogonalization procedure of Klein and Chow (2013).23 
The results for government bond funds are presented in Super-Panel I of Table 10 where 
Panel A use alphas from the SF-model and Panel B uses the MF4-model. The regressions using 
the term structure variables separately show that alphas from the broad index on the left are 
significantly driven by changes of all three term structure parameters, especially by changes of 
level and slope. This is also true when using the three orthogonalized term structure variables 
in combination. Further, looking at the adjusted R2 of 2% for level and slope reveals that the 
term structure variables have some explanatory power over alpha. These results vanish almost 
completely if we look at the results for the duration-adjusted alphas. Here, the term structure 
variables display statistically insignificant coefficients. Moreover, the adjusted R2 is zero in all 
                                                 
22 Alternative panel regressions using time-fixed effects yield similar results and are available upon request. 
23 The correlations are as high as: ρdLdS = -79%; ρdLdC = 38%; ρdSdC = 82%. The procedure by Klein and Chow 
(2013) is designed to construct uncorrelated variables which, however, maintain very high correlations with the 
initial factors and thus allow similar economic interpretations. Alternative results using a conventional 
orthogonalization with level as the base variable are economically similar and available upon request. 
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cases showing that term structure changes have no explanatory power over our duration-
adjusted performance.  
[Insert Table 10 here.] 
The results for corporate bond funds in Super Panel II are similar, albeit a bit weaker which is 
in line with our previous finding that the duration bias is generally less strong in corporate bond 
funds compared to government bond funds. Overall, the results of this analysis prove that bond 
fund alphas using the usual broad index are driven by term structure changes while our duration-
adjusted model provides an unbiased measure of bond fund performance. 
4.6 Implications of duration-adjusted performance for prior and future research 
4.6.1 Performance persistence 
From the previous sections it is by now clear that for both types of funds, government and 
corporate bond funds, the usual performance measurement using a broad bond index to capture 
term-structure risk suffers from an economically relevant duration bias. Overall and in “normal” 
phases of widening term-spreads, this bias leads to significant overestimation of the 
performance of short-term bond funds and underestimation of the performance of long-term 
bond funds. During phases with a contracting term-spread, it is consistently the other way 
around.  
Therefore, we next analyze if another usual finding by previous bond fund studies that 
bond fund performance is persistent over time (e.g. Huij and Derwall, 2008) could at least partly 
be driven by this systematic over- and underestimation of specific fund groups. Closely 
following the methodology of Huij and Derwall (2008), we use bond fund alphas from non-
overlapping 12-months rolling windows using the four MF-models introduced in Eqs. (7) to 
(10). As term-risk benchmarks, we alternatively use the broad index, the term factor as well as 
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two versions of the duration-adjusted benchmark. Version “average” uses the same index as in 
Sections 4 and 5 where we identify the duration-adjusted benchmark based on the average 
lifetime duration of the funds. Version “monthly” creates a new hypothetical index for each 
fund by using in each month the return of the index with the nearest duration to that of the fund 
during this month. 
Table 11 shows the results of performance persistence tests similar to those by Huij and 
Derwall (2008), where Super-Panel I reports government bond funds and Super-Panel II 
corporate bond funds. The respective Panel A presents the average slope coefficients and R2 
statistics of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of contemporary alpha on 
one-year lagged alpha while Panels B report respective Spearman rank correlations. The Fama 
and MacBeth regressions in Panel I.A for government bond funds using the broad index and 
the term factor show the usual finding that performance persists with relatively high coefficients 
and R2 statistics. These parameters clearly reduce if either version of the duration-adjusted 
benchmark is used in the performance models, especially in MFs 2–4 where the coefficients are 
not statistically significant anymore. Similar results are displayed in Panel I.B for the Spearman 
rank correlations which are higher when using the broad index or the term factor and 
distinctively lower and less significant when using either version of the duration-adjusted 
benchmark. This leads us to the conclusion that for government bond funds, a considerable 
portion of the usual finding that bond fund performance persists is due to the use of benchmarks 
with an inappropriate duration that induces persistence mechanically through the duration bias 
shown in the previous sections. 
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
For corporate bond funds in the lower half of the table, these findings are less pronounced. 
Firstly, the coefficients and R2 statistics of the Fama and MacBeth-regressions in Panel II.A are 
overall lower than in Panel I.A indicating lower overall persistence. Secondly, probably due to 
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the larger sample size, the coefficients are statistically significant for all benchmarks. However, 
coefficients and R2 statistics still reduce from using the broad index or the term factor to using 
either version of the duration-adjusted benchmark. The same applies for the Spearman rank 
correlations in Panel II.B. On the one hand, this finding is consistent with some part of the 
persistence in corporate bond funds being mechanically driven by duration bias. On the other 
hand, it is in accordance with our finding in previous sections that the duration bias is less 
relevant for corporate bond funds than for government bond funds because of the higher relative 
importance of other risks. Overall, this confirms our expectation that performance persistence 
in bond funds is at least partly driven by the mechanical duration bias through the use of 
inappropriate benchmarks and less by “hot hands.” 
4.6.2 Prospectus benchmark analysis  
As we show in the previous sections, using the wrong benchmark can significantly bias the 
measured performance of mutual funds upwards, i.e. by using an index with a too long duration 
during “normal” periods. Thus, measured performance may be subject to manipulation if bond 
fund managers are aware of the duration bias and accordingly name indices with too long 
durations as their official benchmarks. To analyze whether bond fund managers use this 
opportunity, e.g. to attract investor flows, we use the name of the prospectus benchmark index 
provided via Morningstar for a subset of the funds in our sample. For these, we manually extract 
the indices’ maturity ranges and compare those to the maturity ranges of the indices identified 
in Section 4.4.1 by average duration as the funds’ duration-adjusted benchmarks.24  
[Insert Table 12 here.] 
                                                 
24 While this method lacks precision compared to a comparison directly using the prospectus benchmarks’ 
durations, this latter information is unfortunately not given in the database. 
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Table 12 reports the results with Panel A showing government bond funds and Panel B 
corporate bond funds. The table shows for each duration-adjusted benchmark group in the 
columns the number of funds with a specific maturity-range according to prospectus 
benchmark. The first thing to notice is that a large number of funds do either not specify any 
maturity range or name an “intermediate” or “broad” index as their prospectus benchmark. 
More importantly, the second thing to notice is that the maturity ranges overall show an 
excellent match with the duration-adjusted benchmark groups as indicated by the shaded areas 
in both panels. But there are also extreme cases, e.g. for corporate bond funds, where the 
duration-adjusted benchmark is the 1–3 index and the prospectus benchmark specifies an index 
with a maturity range of 10+ years. However, those are very rare. 
Thus, we conclude that managers are on average unaware of the opportunity to 
manipulate measured performance by naming a too long benchmark index. Or they are plain 
honest. This further raises the question why previous research does not properly account for the 
average duration or term to maturity of bond funds, given that the maturity range is more or 
less correctly specified by most government and corporate bond funds via their prospectus 
benchmarks? Finally, it confirms our overall argument that using a benchmark with an 
appropriate duration is important for both academic research and practical performance 
assessment. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Can we measure bond fund performance the same way as we measure equity fund performance? 
In this paper, we answer this important question with a clear: No and Yes! No, because the non-
linear relation between bond returns and systematic term-risk as measured by duration leads to 
a significant mechanical bias in bond fund performance if the benchmark index’s duration does 
not match the duration of the fund. Hence using the same benchmark index for all bond funds 
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like we do in equity fund studies may not be recommended. Yes because the solution to this 
problem is quite simple in that we propose using for each bond fund the one index from a variety 
of alternative indices which best matches the duration of the fund to measure its duration-
adjusted performance. Thus, overall we can continue to use similar methods as with equity 
funds but still measure performance in a consistent, unbiased way. 
In a broad range of empirical tests using US Treasury indices focusing on different 
maturity ranges and a comprehensive sample of US government and corporate bond funds, we 
show that the duration bias in measured bond fund performance is statistically and economically 
significant. About the usual use of a broad Treasury bond index, duration-adjusted performance 
is lower on average indicating a potential overestimation of average bond fund performance in 
previous research. Moreover, due to the systematic over- and underestimation of the 
performance of specific fund groups, the consistent previous finding of performance persistence 
in bond funds can be at least partly traced back to the duration bias. Finally, we show that the 
fund’s self-stated prospectus benchmarks provide dependable information on the fund’s 
maturity range facilitating the identification of each fund’s specific duration-adjusted 
benchmark.  
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Appendix A – Derivation of the term structure function  
The following derivation of a term structure model with economically interpretable parameters 
level (L), slope (S), and curvature (C) is based on Wilkens’ (1994) modification of Eq. (A1) 
used by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1991), where rT,K,i is the empirical 
yield of bond i with maturity in T and coupon K. 
rT,K,i = b0 + b1 Ti + b2 ln Ti + b3 Ki + b4 ln Ki + ei (A1) 
Taking expectations yields 
rT,K = b0 + b1 T + b2 ln T + b3 K + b4 ln K. (A2) 
Assuming homogeneous coupons for similar maturities at each point in time allows replacing 
the coupon effect with a constant k = b3 K + b4 ln K . 
rT = b0 + b1 T + b2 ln T + k (A3) 
As coefficients b0 – b2 have no economically meaningful interpretation, they are subsequently 
replaced with alternative coefficients via canonical variable transformation. Therefore, three 
explicit maturities, one for each coefficient, are inserted into Eq. (A3). 
r1 = b0 + b1 1 + b2 ln 1 + k 
r5 = b0 + b1 5 + b2 ln 5 + k 
r10 = b0 + b1 10 + b2 ln 10 + k. 
 
Now, b0 is expressed as a combination of r1 and b1. 
b0 = r1 – b1 – k (A4) 
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b1 is expressed as a combination of r5, r1, and b2. 
r5 = r1 – b1 – k + b1 5 + b2 ln 5 + k 
r5 = r1 + b1 4 + b2 ln 5 
 
b1 = 
r5 – r1 – b2 ln 5
4
 (A5) 
b2 is expressed as a combination of all three interest rates. 
r10 = r1 – b1 – k + b1 10 + b2 ln 10 + k 
r10 = r1 + b1 9 + b2 ln 10 
r10 = r1 + 
r5 – r1 – b2 ln 5
4
 9 + b2 ln 10 
r10 = r1 + 
9
4
 r5 – 
9
4
 r1 – 
9
4
 b2 ln 5 + b2 ln 10 
r10 = r1 + 
9
4
 r5 – 
9
4
 r1 – 1.31865021 b2 
r10 = 
9
4
 r5 – 
5
4
 r1 – 1.31865021 b2 
 
b2 = 
2.25 r5 – 1.25 r1 – r101.31865021  (A6) 
Next, parameters b0 – b2 in Eq. (A3) are substituted with the respective Eqs. (A4) to (A6). 
rT = b0 + b1 T + b2 ln T + k 
rT = r1 – b1 – k + b1 T + b2 ln T + k 
rT = r1 – b1 + b1 T + b2 ln T 
rT = r1 + b1 (T – 1) + b2 ln T 
rT = r1 + 
r5 – r1 – b2 ln 5
4
R (T – 1) + b2 ln T 
rT = r1 + 
r5 – r1
4
 (T – 1) – 
b2 ln 5
4
 (T – 1) + b2 ln T 
rT = r1 + 
r5 – r1
4
R (T – 1) + b2 (ln T – 
ln 5 (T – 1)
4
) 
rT = r1 + 
r5 – r1
4
R (T – 1) + 
2.25 r5 – 1.25 r1 – r101.31865021 R (ln T – ln 5 (T – 1)4 ) 
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rT = r1 – 
r1
4
R (T – 1) – 0.947939029 r1 ln T + 0.381412253 r1 (T – 1) 
+ 
r5
4
R (T – 1) + 1.706290253 r5 ln T – 0.686542055 r5 (T – 1) 
– 
r10 ln T
1.31865021
 + 0.305129802 r10 (T – 1) 
 
rT = r1 – 
r1
4
R (T – 1) – 0.947939029 r1 ln T + 0.381412253 r1 (T – 1) 
+ 
r5
4
R (T – 1) + 1.706290253 r5 ln T – 0.686542055 r5 (T – 1) 
– 
r10 ln T
1.31865021
 + 0.305129802 r10 (T – 1) 
 
rT = r1 �1 – 14  T + 14 (– 0.947939029) ln T + 0.381412253 (T – 1)� 
+ r5 �
1
4
(T – 1) + 1.706290253 ln T – 0.686542055 (T – 1)� 
+ r10 (0.305129802 (T – 1) – 0.758351223 ln T ) 
 
rT = r1 (0.868587747 + 0.131412253 T – 0.947939029 ln T ) 
+ r5 (0.436542055 – 0.436542055 T + 1.706290253 ln T ) 
+ r10 (–0.305129802 + 0.305129802 T – 0.758351223 ln T) 
(A7) 
 
Next, explicit functional forms for level (L), slope (S) and curvature (C) are defined using the 
same three maturities as above. 
  L = r1  
 S = 
r10 – r1
9
 (r10 = L + 9 S) 
 C = r5 – r1 – 4 S (r5 = L + C + 4 S) 
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Finally, the interest rates in Eq. (A7) are replaced with the functions for L, S, and C. 
rT = r1 (0.868587747 + 0.131412253 T – 0.947939029 ln T ) 
+ r5 (0.436542055 – 0.436542055 T + 1.706290253 ln T ) 
+ r10 (– 0.305129802 + 0.305129802 T – 0.758351223 ln T ) 
 
rT = L (0.868587747 + 0.131412253 T – 0.947939029 ln T ) 
+ (L + C + 4 S) (0.436542055 – 0.436542055 T + 1.706290253 ln T ) 
+ (L + 9 S) (– 0.305129802 + 0.305129802 T – 0.758351223 ln T ) 
 
rT = 0.868587747 L + 0.131412253 T L – 0.947939029 (ln T) L 
+ 0.436542055 L – 0.436542055 T L + 1.706290253 (ln T) L 
+ 0.436542055 C – 0.436542055 T C + 1.706290253 (ln T) C 
+ 1.74616822 S – 1.74616822 T S + 6.825161012 (ln T) S 
– 0.305129802 L + 0.305129802 T L – 0.758351223 (ln T) L 
– 2.746168218 S + 2.746168218 T S – 6.825161007 (ln T) S 
 
rT = L + S (T – 1) + C (0.436542055 – 0.436542055 T + 1.706290253 ln T ). (A8) 
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Appendix B 
Table A 
Spot rates, bond prices and bond returns for Figure 1, Scenario (iii) 
 
 Basic term-structure  After the term-structure change 
T 
Spot rate  
rT 
ZB price  
PT 
Spot rate  
rT 
ZB price  
PT 
ZB return 
dPT/PT 
Lin. Approx. 
with 10y 
       
1 1.00% 0.9901 1.00% 0.9901 0.000% 0.000% 
2 2.06% 0.9600 1.91% 0.9629 0.295% 1.527% 
3 2.75% 0.9218 2.45% 0.9299 0.881% 3.054% 
4 3.29% 0.8785 2.84% 0.8940 1.762% 4.582% 
5 3.75% 0.8319 3.15% 0.8564 2.942% 6.109% 
6 4.16% 0.7832 3.41% 0.8180 4.431% 7.636% 
7 4.53% 0.7336 3.63% 0.7793 6.240% 9.163% 
8 4.87% 0.6836 3.82% 0.7409 8.383% 10.690% 
9 5.19% 0.6341 3.99% 0.7030 10.878% 12.218% 
10 5.50% 0.5854 4.15% 0.6659 13.745% 13.745% 
11 5.79% 0.5381 4.29% 0.6297 17.009% 15.272% 
12 6.08% 0.4926 4.43% 0.5945 20.698% 16.799% 
13 6.35% 0.4490 4.55% 0.5605 24.845% 18.327% 
14 6.62% 0.4076 4.67% 0.5278 29.488% 19.854% 
15 6.88% 0.3685 4.78% 0.4963 34.669% 21.381% 
16 7.14% 0.3319 4.89% 0.4661 40.438% 22.908% 
17 7.39% 0.2977 4.99% 0.4372 46.850% 24.435% 
18 7.63% 0.2661 5.08% 0.4097 53.969% 25.963% 
19 7.87% 0.2369 5.17% 0.3834 61.867% 27.490% 
20 8.11% 0.2101 5.26% 0.3585 70.625% 29.017% 
       
       
This table shows spot rates, zero-bond prices and zero-bond returns for the basic term-structure setup and 
Scenario (iii) of the sensitivity analysis presented in of Section 4.2. 
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Figures and Tables 
Term-structure Instantaneous zero-bond returns 
 
  
Scenario (i) Isolated increase of the level (dL = +1.0%, dS = 0, dC = 0) 
 
  
Scenario (ii) Isolated increase of the slope (dL = 0, dS = +0.15%, dC = 0) 
 
  
Scenario (iii) Isolated decrease of the slope (dL = 0, dS = –0.15%, dC = 0) 
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Term-structure Instantaneous zero-bond returns 
 
  
Scenario (vi) Isolated increase of the curvature (dL = 0, dS = 0, dC = +0.15%) 
 
  
Scenario (v) Combined increase of all 3 factors (dL = +0.25%, dS = +0.15%, dC = +0.15%) 
 
  
Scenario (vi) Level increase combined with decrease of slope and curvature (dL = +1.0%, dS = –0.1%, dC = –0.2%) 
  
  
Figure 1. Sensitivity analysis 
The left column of this table shows plots of different term structures before (Basic) and after term-structure changes based on 
Eq. (1) for different example term-structure change scenarios. The basic scenario is: L=1.0%, S=0.5%, C=0.75%. The right 
columns show the respective zero-bond returns as well as linear approximations thereof using the zero-bonds with maturity in 
1 and 10 years.  
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Panel A. Development of Treasury yields over time 
 
 
Panel B. Term spread (10yr-1yr) over time  
 
 
Figure 2. Term-structure 
This figure shows the development of different Treasury yields (Panel A) as well as the development of the term spread (Panel 
B) over the sample period from 01/1990 to 12/2014. All figures are denoted in % p.a. 
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Panel A. 1–3y  
 
 
Panel B. 5–10y  
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Panel C. 10y+  
 
 
Figure 3. Rolling window duration bias 
This figure shows the development of the duration bias in rolling 5-year windows over the sample period from 01/1990 to 
12/2014. Duration bias is denoted in % p.a. 
 
  
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
1998m12 2002m12 2006m12 2010m121994m12 2014m12
1-3y 1-5y 3-5y 5-7y 5-10y
7-15y 10-15y 5y+ broad term
55 
Table 1 
US Treasury index duration statistics 
      
Panel A. Duration and quality, overall period (1997-2014) 
      
 Duration (in years) Average 
Quality   Maturity range Average Std. dev. Min Median Max 
      
  1–3 years 1.75 0.11 1.58 1.70 1.94 AAA 
  1–5 years 2.43 0.19 2.11 2.37 2.75 AAA 
  3–5 years 3.55 0.18 3.18 3.50 3.85 AAA 
  5–7 years 4.99 0.41 4.33 4.81 5.69 AAA 
  5–10 years 6.02 0.40 5.28 6.03 6.63 AAA 
  7–15 years 7.16 0.71 5.80 7.32 8.09 AAA 
  10–15 years 7.99 1.36 5.37 8.41 9.85 AAA 
  5+ years 8.95 0.54 8.03 8.83 10.54 AAA 
  10+ years 12.09 2.14 9.99 11.01 16.68 AAA 
      
  Broad 5.44 0.35 4.69 5.40 6.13 AAA 
      
Panel B. Average duration over time 
      
Sub-period 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 10–15 5+ 10+ Broad 
      
1997-1999 1.66 2.25 3.42 4.72 5.57 6.07 5.67 8.72 10.54 5.20 
2000-2002 1.64 2.23 3.35 4.72 5.51 6.48 6.96 8.96 10.73 5.68 
2003-2005 1.70 2.36 3.52 4.62 6.00 7.29 8.30 8.95 10.89 5.39 
2006-2008 1.71 2.38 3.45 4.83 6.09 7.40 8.56 8.37 10.88 5.07 
2009-2011 1.88 2.64 3.75 5.51 6.49 7.79 8.90 8.82 13.35 5.40 
2012-2014 1.90 2.72 3.80 5.60 6.45 7.92 9.57 9.90 16.17 5.90 
      
This table shows summary statistics on the durations of ten BofAML US Treasury bond indices in 
the period from 01/1997 to 12/2014. Panel A displays different statistics in the overall period while 
Panel B displays statistics over time for different sub-periods. All figures are denoted in years. 
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Table 2 
Regressions of Treasury bond indices 
 
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 10–15 5+ 10+ 
 
Panel A: Overall period, all market climates 
 
  1–3  -0.2100 ** -0.5916 ** -0.6241 ** -1.0397 * -1.0902  -0.7429  -1.1546  -0.9404  
  1–5 0.1920 ***  -0.3406 *** -0.3956 ** -0.8630 * -0.9658  -0.6798  -1.0547  -0.9663  
  3–5 0.3868 *** 0.2492 ***  -0.0441  -0.4619  -0.5619  -0.2964  -0.6408  -0.5520  
  5–7 0.4352 *** 0.3027 *** 0.0685   -0.4792 * -0.6255  -0.4087  -0.7260  -0.7646  
  5–10 0.6589 *** 0.6134 *** 0.5404 ** 0.4781 ***  -0.1876  -0.0418  -0.3084  -0.4784  
  7–15 0.7514 *** 0.7442 *** 0.7411 ** 0.6837 *** 0.2175   0.0921  -0.1308  -0.3828  
  10–15 0.7963 *** 0.8027 *** 0.8261 ** 0.7598 ** 0.2623  -0.0090   -0.1705  -0.5671  
  5+ 0.8167 *** 0.8423 *** 0.8952 *** 0.8538 *** 0.4261  0.2166  0.3006   -0.3092  
  10+ 0.9544 *** 1.0463 *** 1.2245 *** 1.1982 *** 0.8486 * 0.6428  0.6793 * 0.4312   
          
  Broad Treasury 0.6371 *** 0.5855 *** 0.4969 ** 0.4319 * -0.0880 -0.3235 -0.2275 -0.5654 ** -0.8835 
  Term  1.1345 *** 1.3201 *** 1.6677 *** 1.6931 *** 1.5535 *** 1.4515 *** 1.5432 *** 1.3509 *** 1.1345 *** 
          
Panel B: Market phases with widening term spread 
 
  1–3  -0.6732 *** -1.9310 *** -2.5174 *** -4.9499 *** -6.2746 *** -6.9057 *** -7.6028 *** -10.1889 *** 
  1–5 0.5050 ***  -0.9322 *** -1.4395 *** -3.6055 *** -4.8096 *** -5.3825 *** -5.9987 *** -8.3790 *** 
  3–5 0.9410 *** 0.6090 ***  -0.4195 *** -2.2887 *** -3.3575 *** -3.8650 *** -4.4034 *** -6.5513 *** 
  5–7 1.1132 *** 0.8550 *** 0.3844 ***  -1.7450 *** -2.7585 *** -3.2424 *** -3.7423 *** -5.7991 *** 
  5–10 1.6059 *** 1.5749 *** 1.5274 *** 1.2778 ***  -0.7838 *** -1.1384 ** -1.5492 *** -3.2176 *** 
  7–15 1.7712 *** 1.8217 *** 1.9259 *** 1.7332 *** 0.6642 ***  -0.2720  -0.6646 ** -2.1310 *** 
  10–15 1.8027 *** 1.8700 *** 2.0060 *** 1.8315 *** 0.8295 ** 0.2175   -0.4099  -1.7822 *** 
  5+ 1.8843 *** 1.9909 *** 2.2009 *** 2.0458 *** 1.1243 *** 0.5455 ** 0.3336   -1.2966 *** 
  10+ 2.0292 *** 2.2121 *** 2.5624 *** 2.4712 *** 1.7908 *** 1.3668 *** 1.2835 *** 0.9754 ***  
          
  Broad Treasury 1.5641 *** 1.5117 *** 1.4252 *** 1.1619 *** -0.1598 -0.9608 *** -1.3216 *** -1.7304 *** -3.4222 *** 
  Term  2.2433 *** 2.5616 *** 3.1607 *** 3.1855 *** 2.9508 *** 2.8041 *** 2.9371 *** 2.6868 *** 2.2433 *** 
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Table 2 cont’d. 
 
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 10–15 5+ 10+ 
 
Panel C: Market phases with contracting term spread 
 
  1–3  0.3773 *** 1.0557 *** 1.6494 *** 3.7043 *** 5.1678 *** 6.5734 *** 6.6660 *** 10.2137 *** 
  1–5 -0.2061 ***  0.3729 *** 0.8654 *** 2.5517 *** 3.8324 *** 5.1351 *** 5.1906 *** 8.3719 *** 
  3–5 -0.2829 ** -0.1749 **  0.4360 *** 1.9046 *** 3.0680 *** 4.3056 *** 4.3220 *** 7.2954 *** 
  5–7 -0.3895 *** -0.3702 *** -0.3433 ***  1.1808 *** 2.1826 *** 3.2988 *** 3.3145 *** 5.8359 *** 
  5–10 -0.4912 ** -0.5900 *** -0.7602 *** -0.5660 **  0.6511 *** 1.4989 *** 1.4341 *** 2.9910 ** 
  7–15 -0.4907 ** -0.6267 ** -0.8575 ** -0.7350 ** -0.4344 **  0.6249 ** 0.5993 * 1.5216  
  10–15 -0.4260  -0.5613 * -0.7782  -0.7093  -0.5719  -0.3325   0.1088  0.3639  
  5+ -0.4482 * -0.5681 * -0.7813  -0.6727  -0.5025  -0.1739  0.3286   0.3665  
  10+ -0.0738  -0.0308  0.0822  0.1689  0.3938  0.5929  0.8005  0.6112   
          
  Broad Treasury -0.5294 ** -0.6321 ** -0.8231 ** -0.6384 ** -0.1648 0.3749 1.0841 ** 0.8402 *** 1.9315 * 
  Term  0.1846 0.3169 0.5976 0.6835 0.9455 1.1048 1.2147 1.0683 0.1846 
          
          
This table shows the alphas from pairwise US Treasury index regressions in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014. Panel A reports results using all returns 
during the sample period while Panels B and C split the sample into months with widening and contracting term-spreads. The term spread is defined as 
the monthly difference between the 10y and the 1y Treasury yields. All figures are denoted in % p.a. *,**,*** represent statistical significance on the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Return summary statistics for Treasury bond indices 
         
 A. Widening term-spread  B. Contracting term-spread 
   N Mean Std.Dev p50 N Mean Std.Dev p50 
  1–3 183 1.3690 1.8092 0.7819 153 1.5209 1.2574 1.4456 
  1–5 183 1.2259 2.5383 0.8398 153 2.5885 1.8562 2.8655 
  3–5 183 0.9700 3.9647 0.5927 153 4.5305 3.0121 4.9886 
  5–7 183 0.6506 4.3893 0.3556 153 5.3901 3.3123 5.9965 
  5–10 183 -0.8737 5.9952 -0.4524 153 8.6352 4.6902 9.2566 
  7–15 183 -1.7822 6.8990 -1.1534 153 10.5464 5.4141 10.7318 
  10–15 183 -2.2102 7.5638 -0.9546 153 12.0315 5.9214 11.3210 
  5+ 183 -2.6624 7.8119 -1.8034 153 12.5206 6.2208 13.3792 
  10+ 183 -4.5420 9.6371 -2.6884 153 16.7278 8.4279 16.5168 
         
  Broad Treasury 183 -0.5882 4.8884 -0.6980 153 7.0897 3.7320 7.9734 
         
         
This table shows average US Treasury index returns in the sample period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 split into 
those months with a widening (Panel A) and a contracting term-spread (Panel B). All figures are denoted in  
% p.a. 
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Table 4 
Average error terms according to model “Dur-1” from Elton et al. (1988) 
 
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 10–15 5+ 10+ 
 
Panel A. All market phases, 1990-2014 
 
  1–3   -0.1107  -0.2471  -1.2830 *** -1.4285 ** -1.8369 ** -1.7788 * -3.2128 *** -4.4427 *** 
  1–5 0.0832    -0.0739  -1.0465 *** -1.1495 *** -1.5352 ** -1.4964 * -2.7829 *** -3.9827 *** 
  3–5 0.1172  0.0411    -0.9523 *** -1.0459 *** -1.4540 *** -1.4691 * -2.6170 *** -3.8568 *** 
  5–7 0.4485 *** 0.4992 *** 0.6692 ***   0.0996  -0.1177  -0.0300  -0.9086  -1.6655  
  5–10 0.4189 ** 0.4552 ** 0.6139 *** -0.0829    -0.2410  -0.1932  -1.0735 *** -1.9736 ** 
  7–15 0.4759 ** 0.5346 ** 0.7292 *** 0.0850  0.2025    0.0670  -0.7823 ** -1.6126 ** 
  10–15 0.4520 ** 0.5043 ** 0.6805 ** 0.0240  0.1291  -0.0745    -0.9000 *** -1.7543 *** 
  5+ 0.6265 *** 0.7418 *** 1.0322 *** 0.5180  0.7191 *** 0.5931 *** 0.7024 ***   -0.6068 ** 
  10+ 0.7183 *** 0.8696 *** 1.2162 *** 0.7863 * 1.0411 *** 0.9698 *** 1.1145 *** 0.4544 **   
 
  Broad Treasury 0.5074 *** 0.5799 *** 0.7899 *** 0.1753 0.3098 * 0.1335 0.2372 -0.6028 *** -1.3311 ** 
Panel B. Widening term spread, 1990-2014 
 
  1–3   -0.7567 *** -2.0142 *** -3.7271 *** -6.5252 *** -8.4776 *** -9.4794 *** -11.3998 *** -15.9167 *** 
  1–5 0.5499 ***   -0.8950 *** -2.1566 *** -4.6433 *** -6.2859 *** -7.1123 *** -8.5824 *** -12.2465 *** 
  3–5 0.9880 *** 0.5981 ***   -0.9134 *** -3.1543 *** -4.5712 *** -5.2918 *** -6.3380 *** -9.3722 *** 
  5–7 1.3016 *** 1.0391 *** 0.6317 **   -2.0519 *** -3.2901 *** -3.9025 *** -4.7375 *** -7.2767 *** 
  5–10 1.8975 *** 1.8638 *** 1.8471 *** 1.7072 ***   -0.8940 *** -1.2944 ** -1.7290 *** -3.2705 *** 
  7–15 2.1159 *** 2.1694 *** 2.2908 *** 2.3377 *** 0.7659 ***   -0.3173  -0.6211  -1.8068 ** 
  10–15 2.1737 *** 2.2544 *** 2.4083 *** 2.5087 *** 0.9828 ** 0.2665    -0.3263  -1.3989 * 
  5+ 2.2363 *** 2.3347 *** 2.5297 *** 2.6802 *** 1.1799 *** 0.4601  0.1611    -1.0538 ** 
  10+ 2.3948 *** 2.5571 *** 2.8491 *** 3.1376 *** 1.7392 *** 1.1119 ** 0.8785 * 0.7982 ***   
 
  Broad Treasury 1.8443 *** 1.7922 *** 1.7341 *** 1.5562 *** -0.1739 -1.1044 *** -1.5226 *** -1.9833 *** -3.6517 *** 
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Table 4 contd. 
 
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 10–15 5+ 10+ 
  
Panel C. Contracting term spread, 1990-2014 
 
  1–3   0.5099 *** 1.4508 *** 1.0654 *** 3.4683 *** 4.5433 *** 5.6198 *** 4.6532 *** 6.5813 *** 
  1–5 -0.3651 ***   0.7150 *** 0.0201  2.2073 *** 3.0292 *** 3.8992 *** 2.7891 *** 3.9570 ** 
  3–5 -0.7195 *** -0.4942 ***   -0.9897 *** 0.9799 ** 1.5410 ** 2.2038 ** 0.9581  1.4422  
  5–7 -0.3712 *** -0.0196  0.7051 ***   2.1666 *** 2.9304 *** 3.6905 *** 2.7701 *** 3.7257 *** 
  5–10 -1.0016 *** -0.8981 *** -0.5709 ** -1.8028 ***   0.3865 ** 0.8648 ** -0.4437  -0.7275  
  7–15 -1.0998 *** -1.0362 *** -0.7712 ** -2.0794 *** -0.3387 **   0.4361 ** -0.9371 ** -1.4260  
  10–15 -1.2021 *** -1.1771 *** -0.9795 ** -2.3633 *** -0.6912 ** -0.4022 **   -1.4512 *** -2.0957 *** 
  5+ -0.9202 *** -0.7887 *** -0.4065  -1.5594 *** 0.2763  0.7209 ** 1.2225 ***   -0.1773  
  10+ -0.8924 *** -0.7517 ** -0.3526  -1.4728 *** 0.3704  0.8333 * 1.3411 *** 0.1242    
 
  Broad Treasury -0.7771 *** -0.5849 *** -0.1173 -1.1514 *** 0.7746 *** 1.3229 *** 1.9280 *** 0.7236 ** 0.8985 
          
          
This table shows the average pricing errors from pairwise US Treasury Dur-1 calculations following Elton et al. (1988) in the period from 01/1990 to 
12/2014. Panel A reports results using all returns during the sample period while Panels B and C split the sample into months with widening and contracting 
term-spreads. The term spread is defined as the monthly difference between the 10y and the 1y Treasury yields. All figures are denoted in % p.a. *,**,*** 
represent statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Bond fund summary statistics 
          
 Average Std. deviation p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Government bond funds (127 funds) 
          
Effective duration (years) 4.12 2.70 1.00 2.11 4.07 5.30 7.68 3.00 24.44 
TNA (mil US$) 598.32 2,028.76 9.50 51.16 127.90 403.40 2,156.50 8.20 84.15 
Age (years) 8.88 5.91 1.08 4.08 7.83 12.83 20.17 0.63 2.65 
Expense Ratio (p.a.) 0.70% 0.37% 0.26% 0.51% 0.68% 0.83% 1.13% 5.06 64.85 
Turnover Ratio (p.a.) 154% 236% 13% 42% 90% 180% 480% 9.12 158.91 
Implied net flow (p.a.) 1.30% 23.12% -6.29% -1.47% -0.08% 1.70% 10.21% 47.39 3,160.29 
Avg.% government bonds 71.63% 16.10% 52.03% 57.54% 67.89% 85.97% 99.37% 0.46 1.90 
Avg.% corporate bonds 15.81% 12.24% 0.77% 5.33% 11.67% 25.08% 37.39% 0.51 2.06 
Avg.% cash 2.38% 8.09% -6.07% 1.48% 2.86% 4.72% 12.48% -2.59 22.85 
          
Panel B. Corporate bond funds (291 funds) 
          
Effective duration (years) 4.09 1.83 1.40 3.22 4.14 4.82 6.77 2.13 32.23 
TNA (mil US$) 560.98 1,591.04 10.20 47.00 133.50 436.00 2,317.70 7.73 80.97 
Age (years) 8.30 5.86 0.83 3.42 7.17 12.25 19.42 0.71 2.84 
Expense Ratio (p.a.) 0.92% 0.38% 0.34% 0.69% 0.89% 1.11% 1.61% 0.46 3.97 
Turnover Ratio (p.a.) 112% 136% 19% 42% 72% 124% 353% 4.63 39.14 
Implied net flow (p.a.) 2.95% 89.61% -6.07% -1.17% 0.33% 2.63% 12.67% 142.10 23,936.13 
Avg.% government bonds 10.85% 12.05% 0.00% 0.02% 5.50% 19.82% 33.40% 0.84 2.49 
Avg.% corporate bonds 73.83% 14.74% 51.26% 59.96% 74.53% 88.26% 94.41% -0.08 1.59 
Avg.% cash 5.30% 6.10% 0.33% 2.64% 4.22% 5.56% 16.30% 4.60 35.86 
          
          
This table shows pooled summary statistics for active US domestic government bond funds (Panel A) and active US domestic corporate bond funds (Panel B) in the sample period from 
01/1990 to 12/2014. 
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Table 6 
Government bond fund performance 
 
 SF-model  MF-model 1  MF-model 2  MF-model 3  MF-model 4 
  Benchmark Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – 
 
Panel A. Overall period, all market climates, net returns (% p.a.) 
  1–3 -0.3209 *** 0 32 -1.3747 *** 0 61 -1.4390 *** 0 88 -1.4224 *** 0 86 -1.6043 *** 0 85 
  1–5 -0.2275 *** 5 25 -1.3915 *** 0 72 -1.3572 *** 0 82 -1.3625 *** 0 80 -1.4598 *** 0 85 
  3–5 -0.0367 8 14 -1.1696 *** 1 52 -1.2053 *** 1 65 -1.1944 *** 1 65 -1.1944 *** 1 65 
  5–7 -0.0752 9 15 -1.1692 *** 2 56 -1.2009 *** 1 63 -1.1859 *** 2 61 -1.1643 *** 2 60 
  5–10 0.1058 16 7 -0.7422 *** 9 29 -0.9116 *** 5 44 -0.8095 *** 7 33 -0.7461 *** 10 29 
  7–15 0.1799 ** 18 6 -0.5420 *** 12 16 -0.7903 *** 5 38 -0.6787 *** 7 25 -0.5773 *** 11 20 
  10–15 0.1570 ** 16 7 -0.4582 *** 13 14 -0.8005 *** 2 38 -0.6993 *** 6 25 -0.5390 *** 8 18 
  5+ 0.2786 *** 23 6 -0.4100 *** 15 10 -0.7939 *** 4 35 -0.6804 *** 6 23 -0.4808 *** 13 12 
  10+ 0.4981 *** 25 2 -0.0708 19 4 -0.7707 *** 2 30 -0.6545 *** 6 20 -0.1996 * 17 7 
  Broad Treasury 0.0443 14 11 -0.8287 *** 6 30 -1.0025 *** 2 48 -0.9214 *** 5 42 -0.8653 *** 6 31 
  Term 0.8349 *** 39 2 0.3915 *** 34 2 -0.6907 *** 2 23 -0.5716 *** 6 15 0.2501 ** 26 3 
  Duration-adjusted -0.1053 4 20 -1.0687 *** 0 59 -1.1558 *** 0 70 -1.0936 *** 0 68 -1.0906 *** 0 65 
 
Panel B. Overall period, all market climates, gross returns (% p.a.) 
  1–3 0.3979 *** 23 4 -0.6558 *** 8 11 -0.7201 *** 9 25 -0.7037 *** 9 21 -0.8857 *** 8 24 
  1–5 0.4911 *** 29 2 -0.6730 *** 16 13 -0.6387 *** 16 21 -0.6442 *** 17 18 -0.7416 *** 16 21 
  3–5 0.6817 *** 43 2 -0.4513 *** 21 11 -0.4871 *** 21 15 -0.4765 *** 23 12 -0.4765 *** 23 12 
  5–7 0.6432 *** 45 2 -0.4510 *** 21 12 -0.4827 *** 22 15 -0.4679 *** 24 14 -0.4463 *** 24 14 
  5–10 0.8241 *** 62 2 -0.0242 44 6 -0.1934 * 35 10 -0.0915 37 6 -0.0284 43 7 
  7–15 0.8981 *** 64 2 0.1760 * 52 2 -0.0721 36 5 0.0394 40 5 0.1404 53 4 
  10–15 0.8752 *** 56 2 0.2599 *** 47 1 -0.0822 32 5 0.0188 34 3 0.1788 46 3 
  5+ 0.9967 *** 62 1 0.3079 *** 56 1 -0.0757 34 3 0.0377 37 2 0.2368 ** 53 3 
  10+ 1.2162 *** 64 1 0.6471 *** 64 1 -0.0524 30 2 0.0636 33 2 0.5181 *** 56 3 
  Broad Treasury 0.7625 *** 50 2 -0.1107 39 6 -0.2843 ** 33 12 -0.2035 * 35 6 -0.1475 38 7 
  Term 1.5529 *** 79 0 1.1093 *** 74 1 0.0277 31 2 0.1466 35 2 0.9677 *** 73 3 
  Duration-adjusted 0.6133 *** 41 2 -0.3502 *** 14 9 -0.4376 *** 13 17 -0.3755 *** 14 10 -0.3724 *** 15 9 
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Table 6 cont’d. 
 SF-model  MF-model 1  MF-model 2  MF-model 3  MF-model 4 
  Benchmark Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – Alpha + – 
Panel C. Market phases with widening term spread, net returns (% p.a.) 
  1–3 -3.4755 *** 0 94 -4.6153 *** 0 115 -2.6695 *** 0 99 -2.7465 *** 0 97 -3.6850 *** 0 113 
  1–5 -2.5552 *** 2 66 -3.4879 *** 2 101 -2.3731 *** 1 84 -2.4394 *** 0 86 -2.7735 *** 1 92 
  3–5 -1.7889 *** 10 42 -2.4580 *** 9 80 -1.9110 *** 9 67 -1.9028 *** 9 69 -1.9028 *** 9 69 
  5–7 -1.4616 *** 13 34 -1.9422 *** 12 66 -1.7147 *** 13 63 -1.6509 *** 13 62 -1.5498 *** 12 58 
  5–10 -0.3576 ** 27 9 -0.4646 *** 25 13 -0.7624 *** 24 19 -0.4883 *** 26 16 -0.3546 ** 25 9 
  7–15 0.0814 32 5 0.0536 30 5 -0.3677 ** 28 7 -0.0861 31 6 0.0819 32 4 
  10–15 0.2289 * 28 4 0.2011 30 4 -0.3098 ** 27 8 -0.0884 28 4 0.1854 31 4 
  5+ 0.3643 ** 39 3 0.4227 *** 40 3 -0.2410 * 28 6 0.0287 27 4 0.4400 *** 41 3 
  10+ 0.6959 *** 40 0 0.8508 *** 44 1 -0.1007 25 4 0.0893 25 3 0.8437 *** 43 1 
 
  Broad Treasury -0.3923 ** 26 10 -0.4980 *** 24 13 -0.8147 *** 23 22 -0.5562 *** 23 17 -0.3984 ** 23 11 
  Term 1.2597 *** 51 0 1.4409 *** 56 1 0.0057 24 3 0.1316 25 1 1.4256 *** 54 0 
  Duration-adjusted -1.1213 *** 0 38 -1.4514 *** 0 61 -1.3613 *** 0 53 -1.2094 *** 0 52 -1.1833 *** 0 54 
 
Panel D. Market phases with contracting term spread, net returns (% p.a.) 
  1–3 2.4371 *** 76 4 1.7895 *** 56 6 0.0591 0 18 0.2457 * 4 16 0.8734 *** 21 9 
  1–5 1.8110 *** 63 7 0.9928 *** 29 10 0.0442 3 17 0.2078 3 16 0.3638 *** 5 14 
  3–5 1.5046 *** 57 10 0.5869 * 11 14 -0.0810 3 21 0.0517 3 19 0.0517 3 19 
  5–7 1.1349 *** 43 12 0.0909 4 19 -0.1706 * 1 24 -0.1192 3 25 -0.2069 ** 1 25 
  5–10 0.4934 *** 15 14 -0.5303 *** 2 27 -0.4469 *** 1 38 -0.5235 *** 1 38 -0.4799 *** 0 29 
  7–15 0.3043 ** 11 19 -0.6758 *** 0 28 -0.6930 *** 1 46 -0.7946 *** 1 42 -0.5407 *** 0 26 
  10–15 0.2144 10 18 -0.6367 *** 0 17 -0.8789 *** 0 49 -0.9610 *** 0 42 -0.5209 *** 0 19 
  5+ 0.2446 11 24 -0.6303 *** 0 25 -0.8487 *** 0 51 -0.9241 *** 0 44 -0.4778 *** 0 26 
  10+ 0.8056 *** 20 18 0.1177 2 16 -0.8694 *** 0 46 -0.8063 *** 0 38 0.1578 2 13 
  Broad Treasury 0.3855 ** 14 23 -0.6486 *** 1 36 -0.5761 *** 1 44 -0.7025 *** 1 45 -0.5272 *** 0 34 
  Term 1.0349 *** 21 10 0.5181 *** 8 6 -0.8677 *** 0 42 -0.7515 *** 0 35 0.4956 *** 4 8 
  Duration-adjusted 0.7220 *** 37 6 -0.3045 ** 5 12 -0.3187 *** 0 25 -0.3647 *** 2 22 -0.3097 *** 1 20 
 
This table shows the performance of active US domestic government bond funds in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 where performance is measured using different models and 
against different benchmark indices. +, - represent the counts of funds with at the 5% level positively and negatively significant alphas. *,**,*** represent statistical significance 
on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Duration bias of government bond fund groups 
        
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 (24 funds) 1–5 (10 funds) 3–5 (25 funds) 5–7 (37 funds) 5–10 (20 funds) 7–15 (7 funds) 
       
Panel A. Overall period, MF-model 4 (% p.a.) 
       
  1–3   -0.2330 *** -0.4408 *** -0.5715 *** -1.0762 *** -1.1361 *** 
  1–5 0.1506 ***   -0.2639 *** -0.3577 *** -1.0211 *** -1.0425 *** 
  3–5 0.3069 *** 0.2119 ***   -0.0421 *** -0.7063 *** -0.7492 *** 
  5–7 0.3566 *** 0.2525 *** 0.0442 ***   -0.6674 *** -0.7358 *** 
  5–10 0.5895 *** 0.4762 *** 0.4453 *** 0.4565 ***   -0.2303 *** 
  7–15 0.6772 *** 0.5341 *** 0.5992 *** 0.6350 *** 0.2866 ***   
  10–15 0.7199 *** 0.5077 ** 0.6313 *** 0.6578 *** 0.3864 *** 0.0554  
  5+ 0.7413 *** 0.5500 ** 0.7257 *** 0.7546 *** 0.4358 *** 0.1388 ** 
  10+ 0.9115 *** 0.6850 ** 0.9273 *** 1.0641 *** 0.8942 *** 0.4791 ** 
       
  Broad Treasury 0.5520 *** 0.3454 ** 0.4015 *** 0.3330 *** -0.1248 *** -0.3095 *** 
  Term  1.0958 *** 0.9237 *** 1.3126 *** 1.5661 *** 1.5009 *** 0.9922 *** 
       
Panel B. Market phases with widening term spread, MF-model 4 (% p.a.) 
       
  1–3   -0.6729 *** -1.6833 *** -2.3637 *** -4.9163 *** -4.7884 *** 
  1–5 0.4684 ***   -0.8422 *** -1.3287 *** -3.6907 *** -3.7475 *** 
  3–5 0.8688 *** 0.5379 ***   -0.3719 *** -2.4672 *** -2.6979 *** 
  5–7 1.0198 *** 0.7453 *** 0.2516 ***   -1.8704 *** -2.2196 *** 
  5–10 1.4907 *** 1.4060 *** 1.2516 *** 1.2908 ***   -0.6183 *** 
  7–15 1.6452 *** 1.6100 *** 1.5759 *** 1.7488 *** 0.7062 ***   
  10–15 1.6811 *** 1.5591 *** 1.6068 *** 1.8138 *** 0.9517 *** 0.2042  
  5+ 1.7657 *** 1.8024 *** 1.8519 *** 2.1793 *** 1.2121 *** 0.4552 *** 
  10+ 1.8807 *** 1.8568 *** 2.0804 *** 2.5648 *** 1.9022 *** 1.0631 *** 
       
  Broad Treasury 1.4663 *** 1.3657 *** 1.1861 *** 1.2599 *** -0.0290 -0.6395 *** 
  Term  2.0453 *** 2.1364 *** 2.5625 *** 3.2403 *** 2.6414 *** 1.8012 *** 
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Table 7 contd. 
        
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 1–5 3–5 5–7 5–10 7–15 
       
Panel C. Market phases with contracting term spread, MF-model 4 (% p.a.) 
       
  1–3   0.1765 *** 0.6939 *** 1.1275 *** 2.3378 *** 1.8159 *** 
  1–5 -0.1739 ***   0.2868 *** 0.6014 *** 1.4400 *** 1.2106 *** 
  3–5 -0.2727 *** -0.1160 **   0.2798 *** 0.9012 *** 0.8944 *** 
  5–7 -0.3162 *** -0.2510 *** -0.1178 ***   0.4755 *** 0.5402 *** 
  5–10 -0.2774 *** -0.4487 *** -0.1874 *** -0.2828 ***   0.0783 * 
  7–15 -0.2096 ** -0.5314 ** -0.1991 *** -0.3148 *** -0.1285 ***   
  10–15 -0.0798  -0.5510 ** -0.1594 ** -0.2677 *** -0.1413 *** -0.0130  
  5+ -0.0873  -0.5674 ** -0.1292 * -0.2308 *** 0.0221  0.0809  
  10+ 0.3454  -0.0747  0.2531 ** 0.4556 ** 1.0990 *** 0.7891 * 
       
  Broad Treasury -0.2314 ** -0.6104 *** -0.2465 *** -0.3139 *** 0.0190 0.1255 
  Term  0.5499 ** 0.2184  0.5568 *** 0.8146 *** 1.5574 *** 1.1072 * 
       
       
This table shows duration biases of active US domestic government bond funds in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 measured by the average alpha 
differences between the indices in the rows and the respective duration-adjusted benchmarks of the columns. Panel A reports results using all returns 
during the sample period while Panels B and C split the sample into months with widening and contracting term-spreads. The term spread is defined as 
the monthly difference between the 10y and the 1y Treasury yields. All figures are denoted in% p.a. *,**,*** represent statistical significance on the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Corporate bond fund performance 
           
 A. Overall period, net  B. Overall period, gross  C. Widening term spread  D. Contracting term spread 
  Benchmark MF4-Alpha + – MF4-Alpha + – MF4-Alpha + – MF4-Alpha + – 
  1–3 -0.7519 *** 19 81 0.1379 54 26 -1.7895 *** 16 114 0.6068 *** 54 14 
  1–5 -0.5917 *** 22 73 0.2979 *** 67 16 -0.9874 *** 24 76 0.2039 * 33 19 
  3–5 -0.3791 *** 30 57 0.5101 *** 84 12 -0.3390 *** 33 44 -0.0277 26 26 
  5–7 -0.3335 *** 32 53 0.5557 *** 84 10 -0.0318 44 34 -0.2165 * 19 35 
  5–10 -0.0096 44 34 0.8796 *** 111 8 0.8234 *** 72 7 -0.2514 * 23 34 
  7–15 0.0770 45 25 0.9661 *** 123 9 1.1210 *** 94 5 -0.2774 ** 23 34 
  10–15 0.0767 46 24 0.9658 *** 121 8 1.1398 *** 95 5 -0.2469 28 28 
  5+ 0.1084 47 20 0.9975 *** 127 6 1.3086 *** 102 2 -0.2134 27 30 
  10+ 0.3604 *** 60 14 1.2494 *** 138 6 1.4907 *** 104 2 0.6002 *** 53 19 
             
  Broad Treasury -0.1676 * 43 39 0.7215 *** 104 11 0.7515 *** 62 7 -0.3340 ** 23 41 
  Term 0.6810 *** 83 10 1.5699 *** 163 6 1.8321 *** 120 0 1.0030 *** 74 14 
             
  Duration-adjusted -0.3877 *** 28 56 0.5015 *** 76 9 -0.1046 29 44 -0.1573 25 27 
           
           
This table shows the performance of active US domestic corporate bond funds in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 where performance is measured 
against different benchmark indices. +, - represent the counts of funds with at the 5% level positively and negatively significant alphas. *,**,*** 
represent statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Duration bias of corporate bond fund groups 
       
  X ↓ Y→ 1–3 (52 funds) 1–5 (19 funds) 3–5 (110 funds) 5–7 (72 funds) 5–10 (24 funds) 
      
Panel A. Overall period, MF-model 4 
      
  1–3   -0.2269 *** -0.3292 *** -0.4783 *** -1.1601 *** 
  1–5 0.1366 ***   -0.1939 *** -0.3105 *** -0.8750 *** 
  3–5 0.2247 *** 0.1899 ***   -0.0526 *** -0.4916 *** 
  5–7 0.2428 *** 0.2086 *** 0.0615 ***   -0.4283 *** 
  5–10 0.3257 *** 0.3852 *** 0.4350 *** 0.4183 ***   
  7–15 0.3254 *** 0.4083 ** 0.5539 *** 0.5534 *** 0.0775  
  10–15 0.2977 *** 0.3972 * 0.6055 *** 0.5688 *** -0.0022  
  5+ 0.3165 *** 0.4545 * 0.6075 *** 0.6475 *** 0.0829  
  10+ 0.3965 *** 0.7526 *** 0.9544 *** 0.9063 *** 0.3038  
      
  Broad  0.2421 *** 0.2442 0.3079 *** 0.3063 *** -0.2881 *** 
  Term  0.4886 *** 0.9913 *** 1.2619 *** 1.2968 *** 0.8026 *** 
      
Panel B. Market phases with widening term spread, MF-model 4 
      
  1–3   -0.8220 *** -1.4221 *** -1.9958 *** -3.9647 *** 
  1–5 0.3796 ***   -0.6222 *** -1.1298 *** -2.7467 *** 
  3–5 0.6047 *** 0.5361 ***   -0.3251 *** -1.7160 *** 
  5–7 0.7166 *** 0.8105 *** 0.3310 ***   -1.2851 *** 
  5–10 0.9750 *** 1.4706 *** 1.1797 *** 1.0473 ***   
  7–15 1.0406 *** 1.7011 *** 1.4643 *** 1.4158 *** 0.4610 *** 
  10–15 0.9874 *** 1.6859 *** 1.4822 *** 1.4716 *** 0.4945 *** 
  5+ 1.0509 *** 1.8114 *** 1.6185 *** 1.6959 *** 0.8037 *** 
  10+ 0.9890 *** 1.9036 *** 1.7464 *** 1.9836 *** 1.1667 *** 
      
  Broad  0.9180 *** 1.3750 *** 1.1027 *** 0.9918 *** -0.0697 ** 
  Term  1.0432 *** 2.1326 *** 2.0046 *** 2.4639 *** 1.7583 *** 
      
Panel C. Market phases with contracting term spread, MF-model 4 
      
  1–3   0.3167 *** 0.7189 *** 0.8834 *** 1.1601 *** 
  1–5 -0.0617    0.2595 *** 0.4237 *** 0.6165 *** 
  3–5 -0.0967  -0.1602 **   0.1377 *** 0.3547 ** 
  5–7 -0.2168 *** -0.4210 *** -0.1846 ***   0.1195  
  5–10 -0.3921 *** -0.5535 ** -0.1077  0.0642    
  7–15 -0.5435 *** -0.5654  -0.0530  0.0938  -0.0804  
  10–15 -0.7078 ** -0.4413  0.0723  0.1650  -0.0657  
  5+ -0.5950 *** -0.2834  0.1331  0.1424  -0.0599  
  10+ -0.2026  0.8369  1.1192 *** 0.8500 *** 0.8558 *** 
      
  Broad  -0.5294 *** -0.4848 -0.0720 -0.0456 -0.1838 ** 
  Term  0.0484  1.3063 * 1.5319 *** 1.2562 *** 1.3513 *** 
      
      
This table shows duration biases of active US domestic corporate bond funds in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014 
measured by the average alpha differences between the indices in the rows and the respective duration-adjusted 
benchmarks of the columns. Panel A reports results using all returns during the sample period while Panels B and C 
split the sample into months with widening and contracting term-spreads. The term spread is defined as the monthly 
difference between the 10y and the 1y Treasury yields. All figures are denoted in% p.a. *,**,*** represent statistical 
significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Explaining alpha performance with term structure changes 
 
 
 Broad Treasury index  Duration-adjusted benchmark 
 Level Slope Curvature Combined  Level Slope Curvature Combined 
 
I. Government bond funds 
A. SF-model 
 
  dL : DG -0.0012 ***     -0.0011 ***  0.0013     0.0013 
 (-3.31)     (-3.15)  (1.06)     (0.99) 
  dS : DG   0.0124 ***   0.0086 ***    -0.0056   0.0085 
   (3.91)   (7.17)    (-0.73)   (1.22) 
  dC : DG     0.0016 -0.0001 ***      -0.0023 -0.0018 
     (1.44) (-3.04)      (-1.12) (-0.97) 
 
  Adj. R² 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  N 20,723 20,723 20,723 20,723  20,723 20,723 20,723 20,723 
 
B. MF4-model 
 
  dL : DG -0.0014 ***     -0.0014 ***  0.0003     0.0003 
 (-3.80)     (-3.67)  (0.29)     (0.22) 
  dS : DG   0.0162 ***   0.0124 ***    -0.0031   0.0098 
   (4.56)   (6.46)    (-0.35)   (1.34) 
  dC : DG     0.0021 * 0.0000      -0.0032 -0.0036 * 
     (1.86) (0.01)      (-1.32) (-1.82) 
 
  Adj. R² 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  N 20,723 20,723 20,723 20,723  20,723 20,723 20,723 20,723 
 
II. Corporate bond funds 
A. SF-model 
 
  dL : DG 0.0034 ***     0.0033 ***  0.0034 **     0.0034 ** 
 (2.89)     (2.89)  (2.26)     (2.27) 
  dS : DG   -0.0255 **   0.0147    -0.0278   -0.0175 
   (-2.13)   (1.15)    (-1.40)   (-0.84) 
  dC : DG     -0.0085 ** -0.0067 **      -0.0016 0.0003 
     (-2.52) (-2.25)      (-0.35) (0.07) 
 
  Adj. R² 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  N 36,844 36,844 36,844 36,832  36,844 36,844 36,844 36,832 
 
B. MF4-model 
 
  dL : DG -0.0015 ***     -0.0015 ***  -0.0001     -0.0001 
 (-5.29)     (-5.37)  (-0.11)     (-0.22) 
  dS : DG   0.0113 ***   0.0061 **    -0.0069   -0.0143 ** 
   (3.85)   (2.20)    (-0.94)   (-2.31) 
  dC : DG     0.0008 -0.0009      -0.0005 0.0001 
     (0.79) (-1.10)      (-0.29) (0.1) 
 
  Adj. R² 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  N 36,844 36,844 36,844 36,832  36,844 36,844 36,844 36,832 
 
 
This table shows pooled panel regressions of bond fund alphas using the broad Treasury index and the duration-adjusted 
benchmark on interactions between term structure changes and the duration gap between the index and the fund for active US 
domestic bond funds in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2014. All variables are calculated in overlapping 12-month rolling 
windows. For the combined explanation models, we use democratic, simultaneous procedure by Klein and Chow (2013). Term 
structure parameters level, slope, and curvature are defined following Wilkens (1994). *,**,*** represent statistical significance 
on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are calculated using two-dimensionally clustered standard errors 
(Petersen, 2009). 
  
69 
Table 11 
Performance persistence 
                            
I. Government bond funds (127 funds) 
                            
  Broad index   Term factor   Duration-adjusted (Average)   
Duration-adjusted 
(Monthly) 
                            
A. Fama and McBeth (1973) regressions  
                            
 Coef. R²   Coef. R²   Coef. R²   Coef. R² 
                            
  MF1-model 0.3562 ** 0.22   0.3361 ** 0.20   0.2406 ** 0.18   0.1967 * 0.14 
  MF2-model 0.2790 ** 0.23   0.3915 *** 0.26   0.1733  0.21   0.1734  0.20 
  MF3-model 0.2333 ** 0.19   0.3478 *** 0.21   0.1024  0.17   0.1149  0.15 
  MF4-model 0.1553  0.20   0.1725 * 0.15   0.0806  0.15   0.0754  0.14 
                            
B. Spearman rank correlations 
                            
  MF1-model 0.1915 **    0.2203 ***    0.1228 *    0.0826   
  MF2-model 0.1994 **    0.2253 ***    0.1133     0.1213 *  
  MF3-model 0.1239     0.1609 **    0.0594     0.0808   
  MF4-model 0.1323     0.1556 **    0.0618     0.0619   
                            
II. Corporate bond funds (291 funds) 
                            
A. Fama and McBeth (1973) regressions 
                            
  Coef. R²   Coef. R²   Coef. R²   Coef. R² 
                            
  MF1-model 0.1926 *** 0.10   0.1996 *** 0.09   0.1681 *** 0.09   0.1707 *** 0.07 
  MF2-model 0.1889 *** 0.08   0.1742 *** 0.08   0.1536 ** 0.08   0.1535 *** 0.06 
  MF3-model 0.2123 *** 0.10   0.2117 *** 0.10   0.1537 *** 0.07   0.1596 *** 0.06 
  MF4-model 0.1664 *** 0.07   0.1986 *** 0.08   0.1500 *** 0.06   0.1420 *** 0.05 
                            
B. Spearman rank correlations 
                            
  MF1-model 0.1731 ***   0.1485 ***   0.1454 ***    0.1380 ***  
  MF2-model 0.1717 ***   0.1438 ***   0.1345 ***    0.1343 ***  
  MF3-model 0.2027 ***   0.1799 ***   0.1376 ***    0.1296 ***  
  MF4-model 0.1748 ***   0.1646 ***   0.1410 ***    0.1181 ***  
                            
                            
This table shows the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of contemporary alpha on lagged alpha (Panels A) and 
respective Spearman rank correlations (Panels B) for active US domestic government (I) and corporate bond funds (II). Fund 
alphas are calculated for non-overlapping 12-month rolling windows in the sample period from 01/1990 to 12/2014. *,**,*** 
represent statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 12 
Prospectus benchmarks 
         
Panel A. Number of government bond funds (105 funds) 
         
  Maturity range from 
  prospectus benchmark 
Duration-adjusted benchmark group 
1–3y 1–5y 3–5y 5–7y 5–10y 7–15y 10–15y 10y+ Total 
         
  3 months 2        2 
  Below 1y 2        2 
  1–3y 16  1      17 
  Short-term   1      1 
  1–5y 1 6  1     8 
  Intermediate, broad or  
    unspecified 3 1 19 27 16 5 
  71 
  5–10y    1      1 
  Long-term        1 1 
  10y+        2 2 
         
  Matching 20 7 19 27 16 0 0 3 91 
  Total  24 7 21 29 16 5 0 3 105 
         
Panel B. Number of corporate bond funds (268 funds) 
         
  Maturity range from 
  prospectus benchmark 
Duration-adjusted benchmark group 
1–3y 1–5y 3–5y 5–7y 5–10y 7–15y 10–15y 5y+ 10y+ Total 
         
  3 months 7  1       8 
  Below 1y 7         7 
  1–3y 22   1      23 
  Short-term 2         2 
  1–5y 9 7 2       18 
  Intermediate, broad or  
    unspecified 3 11 104 57 19 3 4 1  202 
  5–10y    1      1 
  Long-term      1  1 4 6 
  10y+ 1         1 
         
  Matching 38 7 104 57 19 1 0 1 4 231 
  Total  51 18 107 59 19 4 4 2 4 268 
         
         
This table shows the number of active US domestic government (Panel A) and corporate bond funds (Panel B) sorted into 
groups according to their duration-adjusted benchmark (columns) and having prospectus benchmarks with specific maturity 
ranges (rows). The shaded areas indicate an approximate match between duration-adjusted and self-stated benchmarks 
according to maturity range. 
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5 Article IV: Option-based benchmark indices – A review of performance and 
(in)appropriate measures 
Markus Nattera 
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(doi: 10.1002/fut.21865) 
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Abstract. This paper reviews the performance and profitability of different option strategy 
benchmark indices provided by the CBOE. Using different approaches to measure performance, 
this study shows that performance measurement of these indices is highly complex and sensitive 
to the model choice. I am the first to control for time-varying delta exposure and develop a 
novel linear option-factor model to catch the inherent option exposure adequately. Splitting the 
sample, I find that outperformance found by previous studies is mostly driven by limited data 
sets. Moreover, the profitability of option strategies for private investors is evaluated on the 
basis of investment products, which are easily investable at low cost. 
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5.1 Introduction and literature overview 
In 2002, the CBOE introduced the first option-based benchmark strategy index – the 
BuyWrite® Index (BXM). Since then, the palette of these indices has experienced dramatic 
growth. More than twenty strategy indices with different underlying indices and different 
properties are available on CBOE’s homepage.25 Scientific researchers and practitioners both 
analyze the performance of these hypothetical portfolios, especially for option-writing 
indices.26 This study reviews the performance of strategy benchmark indices using common 
and novel approaches to measuring profitability. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to 
measure the performance of a large number of benchmark indices instead of exclusively one 
strategy. Moreover, this paper uses a long time horizon as well as different time windows for 
each strategy index, and introduces novel approaches to measure the performance of portfolios 
containing options.  
So far, there are many studies attesting superior performance for CBOE’s strategy benchmark 
indices (e.g., Whaley, 2002 and Ungar and Moran, 2009). The first index published was the 
BXM BuyWrite Index, which is a simple passive covered call strategy that is long the S&P 500 
and sells one-month call options on the underlying index. The original purpose of the BXM 
was to provide a sufficient benchmark for investors whose portfolios contain options.27 Whaley 
(2002) describes the construction of this index and finds more than 20 basis points 
outperformance on a monthly and risk-adjusted basis compared to the S&P 500.28 At first 
glance, this result seems surprising since the BXM strategy theoretically solely invests in the 
S&P 500 and the risk-free rate, because the replicating portfolio of a short call option consists 
                                                 
25 http://www.cboe.com/products/strategy-benchmark-indexes. 
26 A collection of contributions on option strategy benchmark indices can be found at 
http://www.cboe.com/products/strategy-benchmark-indexes/bibliography. 
27 Natter et al. (2016) construct a risk-factor derived from BXM’s return. 
28 The annualized outperformance is therefore 2.76% p.a. 
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of a short position in the respective underlying and a long position in a zero bond. Following a 
covered call strategy, therefore means being long the underlying and simultaneously selling 
some part of the same underlying, whereas the remaining amount of money is invested in a 
riskless bond. An investment in an index mixed with the risk-free rate should not generate any 
risk-adjusted outperformance. Nonetheless, there is a vast stream of literature showing the 
profitability of option writing strategies in the past. Among others, prominent representatives 
are the studies of Pounds (1978) as well as Bookstaber and Clarke (1981, 1984 and 1985). 
Several studies also find outperformance for CBOE’s covered call strategies. Feldman and Roy 
(2005), for example, report an annualized Jensen’s alpha of almost 3% p.a. for the BXM over 
a 16-year period. Kapadia and Szado (2007) analyze a similar strategy with the Russell 2000 as 
the underlying index and report an annualized alpha of 2%. Ungar and Moran (2009) measure 
the performance of the CBOE PutWrite index whose payoff is the analog to a covered call 
strategy and find an outperformance of over 6% p.a. on a risk-adjusted basis. 
This paper contributes to the literature on performance measurement of option-based strategies 
as follows. (i) So far, most of the recently introduced indices have not been analyzed in detail. 
(ii) This paper applies and discusses more accurate methods to measure the performance of 
portfolios containing options by allowing time-varying delta exposure in linear models.29 (iii) 
The volatility as the most important determinant of option values is considered in performance 
measurement via different novel option-factor approaches. (iv) By splitting my sample into two 
separate parts and show that outperformance documented by previous studies is driven by the 
first half (1990 to 2003) of observations.30 In addition (v), I examine the profitability of option 
strategies in different crisis scenarios. While Natter et al. (2016) find superior performance 
                                                 
29 Israelov and Nielsen (2015) and Israelov and Klein (2016) develop an approach to decompose the return of 
option strategies adequately and consider time-varying delta exposure as well. However, their approach requires 
the knowledge of the exact portfolio composition and data on deltas of actually traded options. The models in this 
paper shall be translatable to any portfolio return time-series. 
30 Constantinides et al. (2009) find overpricing in S&P 500 options in this period. 
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among actively managed equity funds investing in options; I examine whether this result is 
transferable to passively managed investments and evaluate benefits of direct investments for 
private investors (vi). Overall, I review and validate previous studies and critically assess their 
results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the data. Section 5.3 
describes the performance models and Section 5.4 reports the results of the empirical analysis. 
In Section 5.5, I highlight the possibility to gain exposure towards option strategy benchmark 
indices. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Data and index description 
CBOE’s strategy benchmark indexes analyzed in this paper can be distinguished into six 
subgroups31: 
BuyWrite Indexes: A BuyWrite Index or covered call strategy is a passive hypothetical 
strategy that is long a specific underlying and writes call options on that underlying. Hence, 
these call options consequently are considered to be covered. The indices of this subgroup differ 
in their underlyings as well as in the characteristics of the written call options.  
PutWrite Indexes: A Putwrite Index writes put options on different underlyings, whereas 
proceeds of the received option premia are invested into riskless T-bills. Hence, the put options 
are cash-secured and therefore also covered. The payoff of this investment strategy is similar 
to that of a covered call strategy. 
Combo Index: The CBOE S&P 500 Covered Combo Index (CMBO) combines BuyWrite and 
PutWrite strategies. The index sells one-month out-of-the-money call options and is 
simultaneously short out-of-the-money cash-secured put options. The result is a payoff that is 
                                                 
31 A detailed description of the construction of benchmark indices can be found on CBOE’s homepage. 
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similar to those of the individual strategies but steeper at the beginning compared to Buywrite 
and Putwrite Indexes. 
Butterfly and Condor Indexes: The Iron Butterfly Index (BFLY) sells at-the-money call and 
put options and buys out-of-the-money call and put options. The Iron Condor Index strategy 
(CNDR) is both short and long out-of-the-money calls and puts with different deltas. The short 
puts and calls exhibit deltas of about -0.2 and 0.2 and the long options have deltas of -0.05 and 
0.05, respectively. 
Collar Indexes: The portfolio of a collar index strategy consists of a long position in the 
underlying S&P 500 index and a protective out-of-the-money put as well as a written out-of-
the-money call. The indexes differ in the characteristics of the options, i.e. the portfolios can, 
for example, be set up at no cost. 
Put Protection Index: The Put Protection Index (PPUT) is a passive option benchmark index 
that follows a simple protective put strategy as proposed by Merton, Scholes and Gladstein 
(1978 and 1982). The strategy is long the S&P 500 index and buys 5% out-of-the-money put 
options to limit the potential downside risk of the long position in the equity index.32 
Historical monthly option benchmark index prices are available with CBOE’s website33. Since 
historical data begin and end at different dates, I limit the sample period to February 1990 to 
the end of 2016 to obtain a comprehensive but comparable sample. Consistent with the literature 
on performance measurement of option-based benchmark indices, I compare the option 
strategies to the underlying index and investment products on benchmark indices (see, e.g., 
Whaley, 2002, Ungar and Moran, 2009). Since I consider only option strategies on the S&P 
500, the S&P 500 total return index (SP500TR) serves as my primary benchmark. The data on 
                                                 
32 For a graphical illustration of the static payoff profiles for all option strategy benchmark indices see Appendix 
A. 
33 https://www.cboe.com/micro/buywrite/ 
76 
the S&P 500 total return index is also provided by CBOE, while data on retail investor products 
stems from Morningstar Direct. 
5.3 Methodology 
The baseline model for the performance analysis is the CAPM regression and the resulting 
Jensen Alpha (Jensen, 1968). 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of option strategy i and 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 is the risk-free rate. Since all of these indices 
are constructed from the S&P 500 total return index (SPTR), this index is the corresponding 
market index in the performance regression. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is Jensen’s Alpha and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the systematic risk 
or can be interpreted as the delta of the option strategy, respectively, i.e., 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 measures the 
sensitivity of option strategies towards the underlying. 
Among others, Lhabitant (2000) and Goetzmann et al. (2007) show that applying risk-adjusted 
performance measures on option-based investments may lead to potential biases in these figures 
since portfolios containing options exhibit asymmetric return distributions with fatter tails than 
the normal. Leland (1999) shows that dynamic strategies consisting of stocks and bonds may 
bias performance measures, which are grounded in a mean-variance framework. Since the 
replicating portfolio of an option is a self-financing dynamic strategy consisting of stocks and 
bonds by definition (Black and Scholes, 1973), even performance measures for buy and hold 
strategies involving options can be misleading.  
Israelov and Nielsen (2015) develop an approach, which accounts for the time-varying 
character of delta exposure into and is therefore able to decompose the option index return in 
single constituents adequately. Their proceeding is very powerful and attributes the 
performance of an investment in connection with options correctly. However, contrary to this 
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paper, their approach requires deltas for the actual options included in the respective portfolio. 
The models presented here are supposed to be applicable to all portfolios containing options 
without knowing the exact portfolio holdings positions. To discover the necessity for allowing 
time-varying systematic risk, consider a simple plain vanilla S&P 500 index call option. The 
replicating portfolio consists of a long position in delta shares of the S&P 500 and a short 
position in a zero bond. When the price of the underlying S&P 500 drops dramatically, the share 
of stocks in the replicating portfolio diminishes as well. It is, therefore, likely that assuming 
constant betas over time might lead to biased estimators for both performance and systematic 
risk respectively for the delta of the strategies. Delta indicates the sensitivity of an option or an 
option strategy to changes in prices of the underlying. Since the underlying of all option strategy 
benchmark indices is the S&P 500, the beta obtained from a CAPM regression can be 
interpreted as the option strategy’s delta. This leads to the necessity of considering time-varying 
beta factors in performance models.  
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) criticize known timing approaches used in mutual fund 
research and show both theoretically and empirically that these models may detect spurious 
timing abilities if portfolios contain options. Conversely, this means that these approaches are 
able to detect option exposure in portfolios and hence, I employ timing models to measure 
performance of option strategies. One approach to allow for time-varying betas is similar to the 
timing model introduced by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) where beta is a linear function of the 
market return. 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
with 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) (2.1) 
The slope coefficients of this regression have implications similar to the greeks of the 
Black/Scholes/Merton model. 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 can be interpreted as the index’ overall delta. 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 indicates 
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the gamma of the strategies’ delta, i.e., the sensitivity of delta to changes in the underlying S&P 
500. 
Another approach including time-varying betas is the Henriksson and Merton (1981) model. 
This approach is different to the Treynor and Mazuy procedure since beta can only adopt two 
distinct values. More specifically, the time-varying systematic risk is a function of an option on 
the market, where 𝟙𝟙 is an indicator function that is one if the market excess return is positive 
and zero otherwise. 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
with 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝟙𝟙�𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡>0� (3.1) 
 
Options added to portfolios generate asymmetric return distributions with higher moments 
different from those of the normal distribution. Hence, several new approaches have been 
proposed by researchers to control for this problem and avoid biases in performance measures.  
Leland (1999) argues that dynamic strategies generating skewed return distributions can bias 
performance measures. In particular, left skewed returns lead to positively biased performance 
measures. Contrary to that, right skewed returns lead to negatively biased two-dimensional 
performance figures. To control for skewness, kurtosis and any higher moments of the return 
distribution, I compute Leland’s Alpha for all benchmark indices (see Leland, 1999). 
 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) − 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓� − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 (4) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖;−(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)�−𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆;−(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)�−𝑏𝑏 (4.1) 
with 𝑏𝑏 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐸𝐸(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)� − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓�
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)�  (4.2) 
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Following Whaley (2002), I additionally use his methodology to determine the risk-adjusted 
performance of option-based strategy benchmark indexes. Whaley’s alpha exclusively 
considers downside risk to calculate systematic risk. 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡, 0� =  𝛼𝛼𝑊𝑊,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊,𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙�𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡, 0� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
In complete markets, option strategies should not be more profitable on a risk-adjusted basis 
than investments in the underlying. However, there is extant literature that options are richly 
priced (e.g. Constantinides et al., 2009 and Chambers et al., 2014). To disentangle falsely 
attributed performance not only due to non-linearities but also resulting from overpriced 
options, I employ the following option-factor model approach inspired by the hedge fund 
related work of Agarwal and Naik (2004).34 I augment the CAPM regression equation with a 
straddle-factor35 to capture non-linear risk exposure that comes from non-linear payoff profiles 
of options. The option strategy factor is the return time-series of buying a one-month at-the-
money straddle and holding it until expiration. The straddle-factor is then computed as the 
discrete return of this buy and hold strategy in excess of the risk-free rate. 
I calculate option prices using the Black/Scholes/Merton formula using the implied volatility 
of actually traded S&P 500 index options derived from the Volatility Index (VIX) to obtain a 
sufficient proxy for option prices. 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (6) 
with 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1; 0) + 𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡; 0)𝑐𝑐𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 − 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 (6.1) 
                                                 
34 Fung and Hsieh (2004) employ a look-back-straddle strategy as a trend-following factor for hedge funds. 
35 An illustration of the option-factor’s payoff can be found in Appendix A: Exhibit 8 
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The straddle-factor model might catch biases arising from asymmetric return distributions as 
well as from potentially overpriced options. 
Many of CBOE’s benchmark indices invest in options to hedge portfolio risk or earn premia. 
The income received from writing options should protect the portfolio from sharp declines in 
crisis periods. I run an additional performance regression with a crisis dummy variable that 
equals one if a crisis took place in a given month and zero otherwise. I determine different crisis 
definitions, for which a detailed description can be found in Section 5.4.5. 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶,𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 �𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ �𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓�� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In a first step, I calculate summary statistics for each group of option strategy indices. Table 1 
shows the results. 
The discrete returns of the S&P 500 total return index (SPTR) are slightly skewed to the left 
and a kurtosis in the amount of 4.2162 reflects fatter tails than the normal. The figures of this 
index serve as standard of comparison for option strategy indices. Option-writing indices, 
namely BXM, PUT and CMBO, have average returns similar to the underlying SPTR. 
However, risk in terms of volatility or semi-deviation, respectively, is considerably lower for 
option strategies. This leads to a finding in line with the majority of previous studies, namely 
that these indices outperform on a risk-adjusted basis. The Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1966) is higher 
for option writing indices than for the underlying index. Other multidimensional performance 
measures, e.g. the Sortino Ratio (Sortino and Price, 1994) or the Stutzer Index (Stutzer, 2000), 
deliver similar results. The payoffs for BXM and PUT exhibit capped upside potentials and so 
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the skewness is more than twice as large in absolute terms as the SPTR’s (-1.2670 and -1.8886). 
In contrast to option-writing indices, the PPUT’s returns are skewed to the right, since the 
inherent long put option limits the downside potential of this investment. This is in line with 
the work of Leland (1999) pointing out that options create asymmetric return distributions that 
are highly skewed to the left or right, respectively. Overall, it is interesting that all indices, 
which outperform the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis, exhibit left skewed return distributions 
with fatter tails than the normal. This is first evidence for the necessity to control for higher 
moments measuring the performance of option strategies. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
5.4.2 Linear performance models and time-varying betas 
Most previous studies regarding option strategy benchmark indices measure the performance 
using linear performance models. The first problem arising from this approach is that options’ 
delta and risk alter over time. Options can be replicated via stocks and bonds, whereas the 
replicating portfolio changes every infinitesimal small time step (Black and Scholes, 1973) and 
thus, beta and delta vary over time. I am the first to consider time-varying delta exposure in a 
linear regression model via approaches as proposed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) as well as 
Henriksson and Merton (1981). I estimate the models for every index over the whole time 
period and compare them with a simple CAPM or Jensen’s alpha approach, respectively. Table 
2 shows the results. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
The majority of option indices (BXM, PUT, CMBO, BFLY, and CNDR) outperform the market 
up to almost three percentage points p.a., although this result is only statistically significant for 
the PUT and CNDR. This is in line with Whaley (2002), and Ungar and Moran (2009). Since I 
analyze a longer time period, the results may slightly differ from previous studies. Option 
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strategies should neither exhibit superior nor inferior performance compared to their underlying 
index after risk-adjustment. The time-varying beta models draw an interesting picture. The 
gamma of both models is highly significant for all indices and both model specifications, i.e. 
beta depends remarkably on the return of the SPTR. 
[Insert Figure 4 here.] 
For further analyses of this phenomenon, the BXM and the PPUT serve to demonstrate the 
rolling character of time-varying delta and risk exposure of option strategy benchmark indices 
(Figure 4). Since the payoffs of these two option strategy indices are contrarian, they are 
especially suitable for displaying the time-varying character of their delta exposure. The BXM 
sells call options in every month, thus, if the underlying rises and exhibits a positive return, the 
amount of stocks in the replicating portfolio of the short call option gets more negative and 
consequently, the BXM’s beta drops. The contrary effect can be observed with the PPUT, which 
is long put options in each month. Long put options are replicated selling stocks short and 
investing the proceeds in a riskless bond. All else being equal, as the underlying’s return 
increases, the amount of shares sold short diminishes and the beta of the PPUT also increases. 
Based on the movements shown in Figure 4, I suppose that linear time-varying beta approaches 
are able to approximate the changing delta exposure character of the strategy indices. 
The interpretation of the performance derived from time-varying beta models is non-trivial. 
Bunnenberg et al. (2017) point out that the constant of these regressions should not be 
understood as the overall performance. In connection with mutual fund performance, the alpha 
reflects the selection performance of a fund manager. The overall performance of an investment 
consists of the selection performance plus the timing performance. Passive option strategy 
indices should exhibit neither selection nor timing. However, it is possible to compute the total 
performance for any investment analytically and therefore; I follow Bunnenberg et al. (2017) 
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to determine option indices’ total performance. For both timing model approaches the total 
performance is not clearly distinguishable from the total performance measured by Jensen’s 
alpha. While the change in alphas is 54 basis points for the Henriksson and Merton total 
performance of the BFLY compared to its Jensen’s alpha, all other figures show smaller 
alterations without losing their original sign and economic significance. Modeling time-varying 
delta exposure seems to be necessary but does not enhance or change the measured performance 
figures remarkably. A possible reason for these similar results could be that the beta of option 
strategies is not a linear function of the underlying’s return. Israelov and Nielsen (2015) show 
theoretically that the functional relation proposed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and 
Henriksson and Merton (1984) is not feasible for portfolios containing options. 
5.4.3 Controlling for higher moments 
In Section 5.3 I show that controlling for higher moments is theoretically essential.Therefore, I 
employ Leland’s approach for all option indices in my sample over the whole time period. 
Moreover, Whaley (2002) published the first study examining the BXM BuyWrite Index and 
proposes an approach that only considers downside risk in returns. Consequently, I estimate 
Equation (5) for the option strategy benchmark indices. Table 3 displays the results. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Since Leland’s alpha is not obtained from a linear regression, there is no test on significance 
reported in Table 3. An interesting finding is that the alphas obtained by both Leland’s and 
Whaley’s models get even more pronounced instead of changing the direction due to left 
skewed returns. For the BXM, Leland’s alpha rises from 1.42% (Jensen’s alpha) up to 2.26%, 
although the skewness is highly negative (-1.2670). The estimated parameters for the PPUT are 
in line with Leland’s theory, since this strategy generates less negatively skewed returns (-
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0.3179) compared to the S&P 500 and hence, the alpha increases or becomes less negative, 
respectively. The same result is observable for the CLL whose skewness is even more positive. 
Alphas measured via Whaley’s model are now throughout statistically significnant. Alpha for 
the BFLY changes dramatically in sign from 2.73% to -10.36%, whereas all other figures point 
in the same direction. This result shows the sensibility of measured performance and the 
dependence of the chosen model. However, I observe that controlling for higher moments in 
performance models does not change results significantly similar to the outcomes for time-
varying beta models. 
5.4.4 Option-factor models 
As introduced in Section 5.3, I employ a novel option-strategy model to measure the 
performance of option strategies. Table 4 displays the outcome of the option-factor model 
regressions. The first thing to mention is that the augmented straddle option-factor seems to 
catch option exposure in option indices adequately (Panel A). Indices systematically selling 
options show negative loadings on the return of the straddle strategy and in contrast, the 
coefficient for the PPUT index, which is long put options, is significantly positive. Since my 
straddle-factor is constructed from both call and put options, I assume that this factor is able to 
detect the correct overall exposure in a portfolio investing (partly) in options with different long 
and short positions.36 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
Since the additional factor is almost orthogonal to the SPTR37, the market beta does not change 
in magnitude and thus, multicollinearity seems not to be an issue in my test setting. However, 
performance in terms of alpha changes dramatically in sign for all indices. For the BXM, 
                                                 
36 Agarwal and Naik (2004) only use separate call and put option-factors. 
37 The linear correlation between the excess return of the SPTR and the straddle-factor is -0.02. 
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CMBO and BFLY the underperformance of up to almost 4.5 percentage points per year is not 
only statistically, but also economically significant. The change in sign deserves more attention. 
According to Leland (1999) left skewed returns generate positively biased alphas and vice 
versa. If the option-factor model adequately catches non-linearities, the alphas should be pulled 
into the opposite direction. Again, the BXM and the PPUT serve to illustrate this mechanism: 
Jensen’s alpha for the BXM is positive and the performance measured with the augmented 
straddle-factor is negative. In contrast, the alpha of the PPUT, which exhibits returns that are 
skewed to the right, changes from a negative to a positive value. The problem of this model 
specification is that I am not able to distinguish between biases that come from asymmetric 
return distributions and such arising from overpriced options. This might be a reason why the 
alphas of some indices become statistically significant, i.e. they could be under- or 
overestimated.  
Another main driver of the profitability of option strategies is the overall market price level of 
traded options. It seems plausible that in times when the price of options is generally high, 
selling options should be more lucrative. The straddle-factor indirectly reflects the price level 
due to the implied volatility that is used to compute actual traded option prices. For a deeper 
understanding of the results, I augment Equation (4) with the return of the VIX in excess of the 
risk-free rate. Every alpha is not statistically indistinguishable from zero anymore. The VIX-
factor shows weak statistical significance, especially for some indices, which exhibited a 
statistically significant alpha in the previous regression setting. 
However, one should interpret the results displayed in Panel B of Table 4 carefully. For an 
adequate interpretation of alpha as risk-adjusted performance as a return term, the risk-factors 
must be directly investable. This is true for the straddle-factor since it is a simple and repeated 
passive buy-and-hold strategy, which can be invested with relatively low cost. On the contrary, 
a direct investment into the Volatility Index (VIX) is not possible. There are indeed some 
86 
investment vehicles, which allow exposure that is highly correlated with the VIX. Futures and 
options on the VIX are traded at CBOE and investment banks offer ETFs and ETNs on these 
futures.38 All in all, there is no such investment product, which exactly reflects the development 
of CBOE’s VIX and hence, the alpha of this performance model cannot be directly interpreted 
as performance denoted in percentage points. 
5.4.5 Crises analysis 
As shown in summary statistics, option strategy benchmark indices exhibit lower risk in terms 
of volatility. The indices are said to have an inherent protection against market declines. Indices 
that sell options have a cushion in the amount of the option premium that prevents the portfolios 
from potential losses. Indices that buy options, especially puts (for example the PPUT), should 
also be limited in losses. Schulte and Stamos (2015) find abnormally high returns in the recent 
financial crisis (2008-2010) in the long run. Therefore, it seems reasonable to test whether 
option strategies prevent the investor from experiencing losses in crises periods.  
I determine five different crises scenarios: crisis scenario (i) is defined following Chalmers et 
al. (2013). Scenario (ii) defines all times as crisis when the implied volatility is extremely high, 
i.e. the VIX exceeds the 75th percentile. Defining scenario (iii), I obtain business cycle data that 
indicates recessions in the U.S. from NBER and St. Louis Fed, respectively.39 The first three 
scenarios reflect acknowledged crises definitions. Finally, I specify two different crises 
scenarios with respect to the S&P500 total returns. Scenario (iv) considers all points in time as 
crisis period when the return of the SPTR falls below the 25th percentile, whereas scenario (v) 
takes all times into account where the SPTR’s return was negative. For every crisis scenario, I 
run the model given in Equation (6). Table 5 shows the result of this regression model. 
                                                 
38 An example for an ETN on the VIX is offered by Barclays Capital iPath®: iPath® S&P 500 VIX Short-Term 
FuturesTM ETN (VXX) http://www.ipathetn.com/US/16/en/details.app?instrumentId=259118. This product 
demands a fee of 0.89% p.a., which is not included in the VIX-factor used in the performance model above. 
39 Data is freely available at St. Louis Fed’s homepage: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC 
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[Insert Table 5 here.] 
Since Equation (6) is not a performance model regression in the classical meaning, the 
interpretation of the parameters is not straightforward. Alpha itself shall not be seen as 
performance in terms of return denoted in percentage points, as parts of the factors in the model 
are not investable. Hence, I focus on the analysis of the crisis dummy variable and the 
interaction with the SPTR’s return. For scenarios (i), (ii) as well as (iii), the crisis dummy is 
consistently indistinguishable from zero. As this coefficient may be interpreted as additional 
performance effect during crisis periods, it seems that option strategy indices do not provide a 
shelter from losses in turbulent times in the classical meaning. However, the last two scenarios 
that are determined solely by the SPTR’s returns exceeding a certain threshold, exhibit crisis 
dummy coefficients that are throughout statistically significant. For the BXM, PUT, CMBO, 
BFLY as well as CNDR, the estimated parameters are positive. According to this result, I 
conclude that these option strategies are indeed able to protect an investor from experiencing 
drawdowns due to crashes in the underlying S&P 500. On the other hand, one can observe 
significantly negative coefficients for the CLL and PPUT, which means that these indices tend 
to perform weaker in crises. The results attained from this analysis could be caused by the fact 
that indices selling options earn premia that serve as a cushion against strong market declines. 
On the contrary, indices that are mainly long options suffer from paying options premia and 
therefore underperform in crises. A possible reason for this phenomenon are unfairly priced 
options so that the realized payoffs are not congruent with the discounted expected payoffs (e.g. 
Constantinides et al., 2009). 
Another important result to look at is the coefficient for the interaction term between the SPTR 
return and the crisis dummy. This estimate is mostly statistically significant in all scenarios and 
the sign pattern is exactly contrarious to the pattern of the crisis dummy. The interaction term 
denotes the additional loading of the market return in crisis periods, i.e. the additional 
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systematic risk the index is exposed to in every scenario. For the first five indices, the 
throughout positive coefficients indicate significantly higher market exposure during turbulent 
times. Significantly negative correlations for the CLL and PPUT reveal a reduction in 
systematic risk when scenario dummy variables take on the value one. This finding is consistent 
with previous results in Section 5.4.2 where I show both analytically and empirically the 
dependency of systematic risk on the return of the underlying S&P 500.40 Since crisis periods 
go along with stock price declines or negative returns, respectively, the sign and statistical 
significance of the interaction term coefficients is coherent. 
5.4.6 Different time periods 
The first study attesting an outperformance for one of the option strategy benchmark indices is 
Whaley (2002) who analyzes the sample period from 1988 to 2001. The outperformance of 
2.76% on an annualized basis is both statistically and economically significant. Ungar and 
Moran (2009) have a longer time frame available (1986 to 2008) and their estimate for BXM’s 
outperformance is 1.92% p.a. It seems that the outperformance diminishes with longer windows 
analyzed and thus, I naively divide my sample into two equally long sub-samples. The first 
sample period spans from 1990 to 2003 and the second covers the time period from 2004 to the 
end of 2016. I repeat the calculations for the descriptive statistics and for Jensen’s alpha, 
respectively, for each sample separately and display the results in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
At first, I compare the descriptive statistics for both time frames. An interesting outcome is that 
on the one hand, the average returns drop dramatically for the entire set of option indices in the 
second half of the sample. On the other hand, risk in terms of volatility does not change 
                                                 
40 One should note that the time-varying beta model by Henriksson and Merton (1981) is nested in scenario (v) 
but in addition, scenario (v) includes the dummy variable indicating negative returns. 
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remarkably and thus, risk-adjusted performance extremely diminishes. For example, the BXM 
exhibits an average return of 11.9% from 1990 to 2003, whereas from 2004 on, the mean return 
only amounts to 5.7%. Since the volatility changes merely by two basis points, the Sharpe Ratio 
falls from 0.22 to 0.13 and is considerably smaller than that of the S&P 500. It seems that 
positive outperformance reported in previous studies was driven by the specific sample period. 
Parameter estimates of performance regression models for the early sample period are in line 
with previous studies on option benchmark indices. Table 6 shows significant outperformance 
at the five percent level for indices that are mostly short options and peaks in BFLY’s Jensen’s 
alpha with more than 6 percentage points on an annualized basis. In panel B of Table 6, 
however, there is no outperformance observable, as all alphas are close to zero and no longer 
statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the CLL. The initial presumption of 
vanishing performance in the second half seems to be confirmed. 
Systematic risk in terms of CAPM beta also changes in the second half of my sample, namely 
it increases for all indices, i.e. option strategies tend to converge to the movements of the 
underlying S&P 500. While the increase in beta sums up to more than 13 percentage points for 
the PUT (0.50 to 0.63), betas in the last three columns do not change significantly but fall 
slightly for these last three indices. 
The question arising from the results obtained from Table 6 is why the results differ in such a 
manner. One possible explanation could be more efficient option pricing. In the first sample 
period options might be richly priced and consequently, premiums earned from selling options 
are considered as outperformance in excess of the S&P 500. Constantinides et al. (2009) 
actually find evidence for overpricing of S&P 500 index options for their analyzed time horizon 
from 1986 to 2006. To analyze this conjecture in more detail, I estimate rolling Jensen’s alphas 
and betas with 60-months overlapping windows. If performance diminishes over time due to 
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for example more efficient option pricing, the estimated rolling alphas should reveal a 
dependency on time elapsed. On the other hand, performance might also be driven by varying 
betas or specific return regimes. Therefore, I run the following OLS regression and the results 
are displayed in Table 7. 
 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
The return of the S&P500 is negatively correlated for the first six option strategies, whereas 
only the BFLY reveals statistical significance. This means that, all else being equal, if the return 
of the underlying is negative the performance of these strategies tends to increase. The contrary 
effect can be observed with the protective put index, whose estimated parameter is statistically 
significant and positive. The different signs are not surprising, since the PPUT and the 
remaining strategies are contrary. Loadings on the rolling 60-months beta factor are entirely 
negative and statistically distinguishable from zero for four indices. Alpha is therefore also 
correlated with different values of systematic risk. A very interesting outcome is the coefficient 
for year, which is highly significant for all option strategies. Strategies possessing mainly short 
option exposure, which can be derived from the loadings on my option straddle-factor in Table 
4, seem to lose performance over time. In contrast to this, the sign of the coefficient for the 
PPUT is positive, which means that the performance increases ceteris paribus over time.  
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Figure 5 illustrates the development of 60-months rolling alphas over time. The performance 
diminishing effect is also graphically observable for most of the strategies and explains at least 
partly the results for the split sample analyses. The fact that alpha seems to vanish over time for 
option writing strategies (e.g. BXM) and underperformance for long option strategies, like the 
PPUT, is less pronounced, is further evidence that overpricing in options as documented by 
Constantinides et al. (2009) diminishes with proceeding time. 
91 
[Insert Figure 5 here.] 
5.5 Analysis of investable products 
Although Cici and Palacios (2015) do not find any effect of options on mutual fund portfolios, 
Natter et al. (2016) find superior performance among U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. The 
outperformance is mainly driven by short option positions taken by mutual fund managers (e.g. 
found with covered call writing). The question is whether this phenomenon is also observable 
among passively managed investment vehicles that bear short option exposure. 
I analyze two different investment opportunities enabling private investors to take exposure 
towards the oldest option writing strategy, the BXM. The products are actively traded and easily 
investable for private market participants at low cost. Specifically, the BXM is represented by 
an Exchange Traded Fund, the PowerShares S&P 500 BuyWrite ETF (BXM ETF), and an 
Exchange Traded Note, namely the iPath® S&P 500 BuyWrite ETN (BXM ETN).41 Data on 
these products is available as early as June 2007 for the BXM ETN and January 2008 for the 
BXM ETF. 
The purpose of this analysis is to test the investments’ eligibility to track the option strategy 
benchmark index and their performance compared to the underlying. Figure 6 shows the 
development of $ 1 invested in the respective investment vehicle or in the underlying index, 
respectively. Additionally, the performance of buying the S&P 500 total return index is also 
included via the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPDR ETF). As the products start at different 
dates, the results are not directly comparable. If a private investor invests $ 1 in the BXM ETN 
in June 2007, she would end up with $ 1.39, whereas a hypothetical direct investment in the 
BXM would have yielded $ 1.46. A conservative and direct long position in the SPDR ETF 
                                                 
41 Exposure against the PUT can be obtained by buying WisdomTree S&P 500 PutWriteStrategy ETF (PUT ETF). 
However, Data is only available from March 2016 onwards and would result in an insufficient sample size and 
thus, I focus only on investments regarding the BXM. 
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returned a much higher dollar amount of $ 1.80. The right graph of Figure 6 shows the dollar 
development for a time frame starting from January 2008 and an ETF on the BXM. The 
resulting final dollar amounts are $ 1.31 for the BXM ETF, $ 1.43 for the hypothetical BXM 
investment, and $ 1.86 for buying the dividend reinvesting SPDR ETF on the S&P 500. From 
2007 to 2013 the S&P 500 performed worse than the option index investments since the latter 
have a cushion for losses in contrast to the equity index. From 2013 onwards, however, the 
outperformance of the S&P 500 exposure is clearly superior due to capped upside potential 
resulting from short option positions of the strategy benchmark indices. 
[Insert Figure 6 here.] 
One dimensional performance measures reveal initial drawbacks of option strategies but do not 
take risk considerations into account. Therefore, I estimate Jensen’s alpha in three different 
model approaches for both the BXM ETF and the BXM ETN, respectively. In scenario (i), the 
market index used is the SPTR, whereas in scenario (ii) the investment’s return is regressed on 
the replicated BXM due to the fact that it should be the adequate benchmark.42 As fund 
companies demand cost for providing ETFs, in scenario (iii) the SPDR ETF serves as 
benchmark as it also includes costs. For all three scenarios, I use both net and gross returns. A 
summary of the results can be found in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here.] 
Compared to the SPTR both the BXM ETF as well as the BXM ETN reveal an 
underperformance up to 1.80 percentage points p.a. However, these measures are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. The BXM is by definition the adequate benchmark for these 
investment products and Panel B displays the outcome of the performance regressions. From 
                                                 
42 Using a linear performance model in this case should be unproblematic since both the investment as well as the 
benchmark are supposed to generate the same non-linearities in returns. 
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the first three columns, one can see that investors do not earn the same return as the underlying 
BXM, as alphas are negative and statistically significant. The gross performance of the 
exchange-traded note is indeed positive but only hardly significant at the ten percent level, and, 
more important; an investor is not able to earn the gross performance of an ETN. Although the 
total expense ratio is 0.75%, the ETF’s performance is slightly worse than the ETN’s 
performance. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the time periods slightly differ and on 
the other hand, the replication is incongruent, what can be derived from the different loadings 
on the BXM (1.0015 vs. 1.0210) as well as from the tracking error43 (0.18% p.a. for the ETF 
vs. 0.17% p.a. for the ETN). 
The last Panel comprises the performance measures for the comparison with the SPDR ETF. 
The similarity to the figures in Panel A is not surprising since the SPDR ETF has a high 
correlation of 0.9977 with the SPTR and is very cheaply investable with an expense ratio of 9 
basis points per year. All in all, I conclude from this analysis that potential benefits of option-
writing indices – as far as there are any – are consumed by the costs investment providers 
charge. This is not coercively conflicting with the findings of Natter et al. (2016), as the 
outperformance of actively managed funds engaging in options the authors measure is 
compared to their non-using peers. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
This study aims to review the benefits of option strategy benchmark indices in terms of 
performance and risk. I show that the performance measurement of such indices is indeed 
difficult and sensitive to the method used. Several problems should be addressed when 
analyzing the advantages and drawbacks of portfolios containing options. One finding is the 
                                                 
43 The tracking error is calculated following Cremers and Petajisto (2009) as the standard deviation of the residuals 
obtained from performance regressions using monthly net returns. 
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time-varying delta exposure towards the underlying S&P 500 index, which might lead to severe 
biases if neglected. However, approaches derived from timing literature insufficiently control 
for this phenomenon. A solution is the methodology as proposed by Israelov and Nielsen 
(2015), at which the evaluator has to know the exact portfolio composition and additionally the 
detailed options’ characteristics (delta). Analytically correct approaches as proposed by Leland 
(1999) and Whaley (2002) are also not able to appropriately disclose performance, as resulting 
performance measures do not differ remarkably from standard methods. The novel approach I 
develop in this study shows significant loadings on my option straddle-factor though it is not 
clear if the constants of these regressions reflect the proper performance. Option strategies are 
said to be protections from sharp market declines, for example during times of crises and, for 
some strategies, I am able to confirm this empirically. Another finding, which is possible due 
to the long sample period, is that eventual outperformance is mostly driven by the period in the 
first half of my sample to the end of 2003. 
Further, I analyze the benefits of the BXM for private investors by measuring the performance 
of two directly investable products reflecting the development of this option benchmark. The 
conclusion, which can be drawn from this examination, is that fees charged by the fund 
companies lead to an underperformance compared to the underlying option index. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics Indices                
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
Mean (p.a.) 0.1034 0.0888  0.1003  0.0936  0.0628  0.0649  0.0642  0.0680  
Vola (p.a.) 0.1443 0.1021  0.0979  0.1060  0.1086  0.0697  0.1033  0.1172  
Semi Vola (p.a.) 0.1605 0.1308  0.1446  0.1343  0.1014  0.1093  0.1034  0.1218  
cum. Return 11.0888 8.3794  11.8883  9.5456  3.6131  4.3358  3.8553  4.1576  
Skewness -0.5928 -1.2670  -1.8886  -1.2496  0.0605  -2.0832  -0.1708  -0.3179  
Kurtosis 4.2162 7.8561  12.0088  7.4806  2.6015  8.6469  2.7314  3.2375  
Sharpe Ratio 0.1511 0.1724  0.2139  0.1790  0.0932  0.1542  0.1014  0.0985  
Sortino Ratio 0.1358 0.1343  0.1444  0.1411  0.0992  0.0974  0.1011  0.0949  
Stutzer Index 0.1490 0.1664  0.2004  0.1727  0.0934  0.1470  0.1013  0.0982  
Omega Ratio 1.6475 2.1058  2.9390  2.0762  1.0974  2.8452  1.2587  1.2908  
Max. Drawdown -0.5095 -0.3581  -0.3266  -0.3813  -0.3375  -0.1366  -0.3547  -0.3892  
 
This table shows summary statistics on the S&P 500 total return index as well as on option strategy benchmark indices. Mean, volatility and semi-volatility are denoted in 
absolute values on an annualized basis. The sample period spans from 1990 to 2016. 
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Table 2              
Performance – Time-Varying Beta Models              
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
CAPM Alpha 0.0000 0.0142  0.0301 ** 0.0157 * 0.0273  0.0256 * -0.0131  -0.0158  
CAPM Beta 1.0000 0.6180 *** 0.5592 *** 0.6616 *** 0.1003 ** 0.1502 *** 0.6531 *** 0.7389 *** 
                
TM Alpha 0.0000 0.0482 *** 0.0709 *** 0.0482 *** 0.0687 *** 0.0685 *** -0.0430 *** -0.0577 *** 
TM Beta 1.0000 0.5994 *** 0.5369 *** 0.6439 *** 0.0777  0.1268 *** 0.6694 *** 0.7617 *** 
TM Gamma 0.0000 -1.5382 *** -1.8436 *** -1.4682 *** -1.8735 *** -1.9389 *** 1.3512 *** 1.8925 ** 
TM Total Perf 0.0000 0.0162 0.0326 0.0176 0.0297 0.0281 -0.0149 -0.0183 
         
HM Alpha 0.0000 0.0811 *** 0.1034 *** 0.0781 *** 0.1295 *** 0.1171 *** -0.0637 *** -0.0814 *** 
HM Beta 1.0000 0.7819 *** 0.7388 *** 0.8145 *** 0.3507 *** 0.3745 *** 0.5293 *** 0.5780 *** 
HM Gamma 0.0000 -0.3392 *** -0.3717 *** -0.3164 *** -0.5181 *** -0.4642 *** 0.2564 *** 0.3329 ** 
HM Total Perf 0.0000 0.0177 0.0340 0.0190 0.0327 0.0304 -0.0158 -0.0193 
                
This table shows performance measures for the approaches following Jensen (1968), Treynor and Mazuy (1966) as well as Henriksson and Merton (1981) based on monthly discrete returns. 
The sample period spans from February 1990 to December 2016. The market index used in all performance regressions is the excess return of the S&P 500 total return index. Performance 
in terms of alpha is denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated 
parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Time-varying betas estimated following Treynor / Mazuy (1966) 
 
This figure shows time-varying betas for the BXM and PPUT, respectively, estimated via the Treynor 
and Mazuy (1966) approach. The time period spans from 1990 to 2016. 
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Table 3              
Performance – Considering higher moments              
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
CAPM Alpha 0.0000 0.0142  0.0301 ** 0.0157 * 0.0273  0.0256 * -0.0131  -0.0158  
CAPM Beta 1.0000 0.6180 *** 0.5592 *** 0.6616 *** 0.1003 ** 0.1502 *** 0.6531 *** 0.7389 *** 
                
Leland’s Alpha 0.0000 0.0226 0.0397 0.0230 0.0496 0.0466 -0.0015 -0.0056 
Leland’s Beta 1.0000 0.6396 0.5858 0.6819 0.1277  0.1768 0.6346 0.7116 
         
Whaley’s Alpha 0.0000 0.0156 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0154 *** -0.1036 *** -0.0277 *** -0.0350 *** -0.0393 *** 
Whaley’s Beta 1.0000 0.7027 *** 0.6465 *** 0.7348 *** 0.2146 *** 0.2692 *** 0.5843 *** 0.6520 *** 
                
This table shows performance measures for the approaches following Jensen (1968), Leland (1999) as well as Whaley (2002) based on monthly discrete returns. The sample period spans 
from February 1990 to December 2016. The market index used in all performance calculations is the excess return of the S&P 500 total return index. Performance in terms of alpha is 
denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameter at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4              
Performance – Straddle-factor model              
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
CAPM Alpha 0.0000 0.0142  0.0301 ** 0.0157 * 0.0273  0.0256 * -0.0131  -0.0158  
CAPM Beta 1.0000 0.6180 *** 0.5592 *** 0.6616 *** 0.1003 ** 0.1502 *** 0.6531 *** 0.7389 *** 
                
Panel A:                
                
Alpha (OF) 0.0000 -0.0264 ** -0.0130 -0.0219 * -0.0442 * -0.0246 0.0137 0.0159 
Beta (OF) 1.0000 0.6153 *** 0.5563 *** 0.6592 *** 0.0956 ** 0.1469 *** 0.6549 *** 0.7409 *** 
Straddle (OF) 0.0000 -0.0116 *** -0.0123 *** -0.0107 *** -0.0204 *** -0.0144 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0091 *** 
         
Panel B:         
         
Alpha (OF2) 0.0000 -0.0196 -0.0066 -0.0141 -0.0295 -0.0142 0.0135 0.0178 
Beta (OF2) 1.0000 0.5878 *** 0.5307 *** 0.6278 *** 0.0366 0.1050 ** 0.6558 *** 0.7332 *** 
Straddle (OF2) 0.0000 -0.0107 *** -0.0114 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0184 *** -0.0129 *** 0.0076 *** 0.0093 *** 
VIX (OF2) 0.0000 -0.0089 -0.0083 -0.0102 * -0.0192 * -0.0136 * 0.0003 -0.0025 
                
This table shows performance measures for the approaches following Jensen (1968) and for my novel option-factor approach in the spirit of Agarwal and Naik (2004) based on monthly 
discrete returns. The sample period spans from February 1990 to December 2016. The market index used in all performance regressions is the excess return of the S&P 500 total return 
index. The straddle-factor is the return of a simple buy-and-hold strategy in excess of the risk-free rate: in month t open a long call and put position and hold it one month until expiration 
and repeat this procedure every month. Panel A displays the results for a CAPM regression augmented with the straddle-factor, whereas Panel B contains outcomes for the same model 
with the return of the VIX as an additional risk-factor. Performance in terms of alpha is denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent 
according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5               
Crisis analysis               
               
    BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
                
Scenario (i) 
Alpha 0.0209 ** 0.0366 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0295  0.0281 * -0.0247 *** -0.0250 *** 
Beta 0.5714 *** 0.5002 *** 0.6133 *** 0.0871  0.1126 ** 0.7193 *** 0.8208 *** 
Crisis -0.0138  -0.0030  -0.0232  -0.0059  0.0100  0.0338  0.0051  
Interaction 0.1436 ** 0.1857 ** 0.1470 ** 0.0402  0.1211  -0.2004 *** -0.2577 **                 
Scenario (ii) 
Alpha 0.0344 *** 0.0538 *** 0.0327 *** 0.0576 ** 0.0612 *** -0.0373 *** -0.0388 *** 
Beta 0.4761 *** 0.4041 *** 0.5412 *** -0.0868  -0.0129  0.7757 *** 0.8898 *** 
Crisis 0.0003  -0.0062  0.0008  -0.0151  -0.0527  0.0287  0.0058  
Interaction 0.2424 *** 0.2624 *** 0.2060 *** 0.3136 *** 0.2574 *** -0.1977 *** -0.2554 *** 
                
Scenario (iii) 
Alpha 0.0228 ** 0.0402 *** 0.0232 *** 0.0369  0.0310 ** -0.0253 *** -0.0261 *** 
Beta 0.5750 *** 0.5040 *** 0.6245 *** 0.0522  0.1114 *** 0.7127 *** 0.8048 *** 
Crisis -0.0310  -0.0289  -0.0277  -0.0335  -0.0039  0.0445  0.0180  
Interaction 0.1560 ** 0.2041 * 0.1346 * 0.1750 * 0.1490 * -0.2158 ** -0.2496 * 
                
Scenario (iv) 
Alpha 0.0507 *** 0.0636 *** 0.0508 *** 0.0894 *** 0.0829 *** -0.0277 *** -0.0415 *** 
Beta 0.4938 *** 0.4339 *** 0.5451 *** -0.0994  -0.0312  0.7290 *** 0.8461 *** 
Crisis 0.1304 *** 0.1838 *** 0.1086 *** 0.1565 * 0.1282 *** -0.1995 *** -0.2042 *** 
Interaction 0.4159 *** 0.4874 *** 0.3724 *** 0.5997 *** 0.5267 *** -0.4096 *** -0.4782 *** 
                
Scenario (v) 
Alpha 0.0419 *** 0.0547 *** 0.0492 *** 0.0792 ** 0.0810 *** -0.0101  -0.0245 *** 
Beta 0.5090 *** 0.4497 *** 0.5470 *** -0.0825  -0.0285  0.6950 *** 0.8145 *** 
Crisis 0.1109 *** 0.1384 *** 0.0816 *** 0.1425 ** 0.1021 *** -0.1527 *** -0.1620 *** 
Interaction 0.3697 *** 0.4102 *** 0.3388 *** 0.5579 *** 0.4922 *** -0.2998 *** -0.3783 *** 
 
        
This table shows performance measures for different crisis scenarios following Jensen (1968). The sample period spans from February 1990 to December 2016. The market index 
used in all performance regressions is the excess return of the S&P 500 total return index. Scenario (i) is defined as in Chalmers et al. (2013), scenario (ii) defines times when the 
implied volatility measured by the VIX exceeds the 75th percentile, scenario (iii) reflects business cycles obtained from NBER and St. Louis Fed. The crisis dummy in scenario (iv) 
is one if the SPTR’s return is below the 25th percentile and in scenario (v), the binary crises variable takes on the value one if the SPTR’s return is negative. Performance in terms 
of alpha is denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated 
parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6                
Summary Statistics Indices Split Sample 
Panel A: 1990 – 2003               
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
Mean (p.a.) 0.1211 0.1188  0.1248  0.1220  0.1094  0.0945  0.0914  0.0817  
Vola (p.a.) 0.1495 0.1018  0.0929  0.1046  0.1037  0.0697  0.1099  0.1254  
Semi Vola (p.a.) 0.1607 0.1289  0.1410  0.1303  0.0930  0.1152  0.1065  0.1283  
cum. Return 3.5854 3.8232  4.2991  4.0199  3.2309  2.5796  2.2694  1.7884  
Skewness -0.4768 -1.2173  -1.8530  -1.1819  -0.0453  -2.1371  -0.0876  -0.2187  
Kurtosis 3.5349 6.6433  9.9957  6.6338  2.2082  8.8091  2.5797  2.9031  
Sharpe Ratio 0.1511 0.2157  0.2553  0.2187  0.1853  0.2141  0.1274  0.0894  
Sortino Ratio 0.1404 0.1700  0.1676  0.1752  0.2063  0.1291  0.1314  0.0873  
Stutzer Index 0.1498 0.2071  0.2377  0.2101  0.1858  0.2005  0.1276  0.0894  
Omega Ratio 1.5692 2.2115  3.2821  2.1509  1.1974  3.3947  1.2877  1.2568  
Max. Drawdown -0.4473 -0.3019  -0.2900  -0.3210  -0.1193  -0.1332  -0.2070  -0.3453  
                
CAPM Alpha 0.0000 0.0296 ** 0.0430 ** 0.0301 ** 0.0615 ** 0.0394 ** -0.0034  -0.0225  
CAPM Beta 1.0000 0.5928 *** 0.4979 *** 0.6267 *** 0.0642  0.1545 *** 0.6640 *** 0.7846 *** 
                
Alpha (OF) 0.0000 -0.0073  0.0029  -0.0036  0.0014  -0.0070  0.0246 * 0.0041  
Beta (OF) 1.0000 0.5987 *** 0.5043 *** 0.6320 *** 0.0737  0.1619 *** 0.6595 *** 0.7803 *** 
Straddle (OF) 0.0000 -0.0121 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0198 *** -0.0153 *** 0.0092 *** 0.0088 *** 
                
TM Alpha 0.0000 0.0728 *** 0.0912 *** 0.0715 *** 0.1286 *** 0.0961 *** -0.0383 *** -0.0542 *** 
TM Beta 1.0000 0.5789 *** 0.4824 *** 0.6134 *** 0.0426  0.1363 *** 0.6752 *** 0.7947 *** 
TM Gamma 0.0000 -1.8601 *** -2.0732 *** -1.7796 *** -2.8876 *** -2.4377 *** 1.4997 *** 1.3628 *** 
                
HM Alpha 0.0000 0.1054 *** 0.1274 *** 0.1017 *** 0.1852 *** 0.1501 *** -0.0693 *** -0.0763 *** 
HM Beta 1.0000 0.7742 *** 0.6998 *** 0.7979 *** 0.3600 *** 0.4193 *** 0.5066 *** 0.6560 *** 
HM Gamma 0.0000 -0.3652 *** -0.4065 *** -0.3447 *** -0.5956 *** -0.5330 *** 0.3170 *** 0.2589 ** 
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Table 6 continued                
Panel B: 2004 – 2016                  
                
  SP500 TR BXM PUT CMBO BFLY CNDR CLL PPUT 
Mean (p.a.) 0.0845 0.0566  0.0740  0.0631  0.0129  0.0332  0.0350  0.0532  
Vola (p.a.) 0.1388 0.1020  0.1028  0.1072  0.1122  0.0689  0.0954  0.1081  
Semi Vola (p.a.) 0.1602 0.1326  0.1478  0.1382  0.1089  0.1042  0.1000  0.1142  
cum. Return 1.6364 0.9446  1.4322  1.1007  0.0903  0.4906  0.4851  0.8497  
Skewness -0.7466 -1.3252  -1.8903  -1.3142  0.1890  -2.0546  -0.3419  -0.4719  
Kurtosis 5.1307 9.1387  13.1610  8.2667  2.9512  8.6021  2.8344  3.6895  
Sharpe Ratio 0.1507 0.1261  0.1742  0.1375  0.0025  0.0894  0.0697  0.1101  
Sortino Ratio 0.1309 0.0972  0.1213  0.1069  0.0026  0.0589  0.0666  0.1045  
Stutzer Index 0.1483 0.1229  0.1653  0.1338  0.0025  0.0871  0.0697  0.1095  
Omega Ratio 1.7368 2.0000  2.6279  2.0000  1.0000  2.3913  1.2286  1.3284  
Max. Drawdown -0.5095 -0.3581  -0.3266  -0.3813  -0.3375  -0.1366  -0.3547  -0.3892  
                
CAPM Alpha 0.0000 -0.0025  0.0160  0.0000  -0.0095  0.0108  -0.0234 * -0.0082  
CAPM Beta 1.0000 0.6487 *** 0.6346 *** 0.7045 *** 0.1441 ** 0.1445 ** 0.6394 *** 0.6825 *** 
                
Alpha (OF) 0.0000 -0.0477 *** -0.0270  -0.0417 *** -0.1002 *** -0.0456 ** -0.0033  0.0281  
Beta (OF) 1.0000 0.6359 *** 0.6224 *** 0.6927 *** 0.1185 * 0.1286 *** 0.6451 *** 0.6928 *** 
Straddle (OF) 0.0000 -0.0114 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0105 *** -0.0228 *** -0.0141 *** 0.0050 *** 0.0091 *** 
                
TM Alpha 0.0000 0.0236  0.0483 *** 0.0242 * 0.0108  0.0433 ** -0.0482 *** -0.0567 *** 
TM Beta 1.0000 0.6266 *** 0.6072 *** 0.6840 *** 0.1269  0.1169 ** 0.6605 *** 0.7236 *** 
TM Gamma 0.0000 -1.2417 ** -1.5424 ** -1.1544 *** -0.9667  -1.5533 *** 1.1832  2.3117 ** 
                
HM Alpha 0.0000 0.0575 *** 0.0770 *** 0.0542 *** 0.0768  0.0879 *** -0.0571 ** -0.0836 *** 
HM Beta 1.0000 0.7988 *** 0.7873 *** 0.8402 *** 0.3601 *** 0.3376 *** 0.5550 *** 0.4937 *** 
HM Gamma 0.0000 -0.3219 *** -0.3276 * -0.2911 *** -0.4634 * -0.4143 *** 0.1812  0.4050 *  
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This table shows summary statistics as well as performance measures following Jensen (1968), my novel option-factor approach in the spirit of Agarwal and Naik (2004) and the time-
varying beta approaches by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) as well as Henriksson and Merton (1981) based on monthly discrete returns. The first time window (Panel A) begins in February 
1990 and ends in December 2003. Panel B displays the results from 2004 to 2016. The market index used in all performance regressions is the excess return of the S&P 500 total return 
index. Performance in terms of alpha is denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance 
of the estimated parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7              
Rolling Alphas 60 months              
               
 BXM PUT CLL BFLY CMBO CNDR PPUT 
               
S&P500 -0.0241  -0.0307  -0.0028  -0.0914 ** -0.0008  -0.0142  0.0446 ** 
Beta -0.0111  -0.0090  -0.1403 *** -0.0140  -0.0215 *** -0.0331 *** -0.0535 *** 
year -0.0026 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0069 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0036 *** 0.0007 *** 
               
R² 0.76  0.67  0.56  0.77  0.75  0.65  0.43  
N 264  264  264  264  264  264  264  
                              
This table shows results for regressions of rolling alphas for all option indices on the return of the SPTR, the rolling beta as well as a year variable. 
The sample period spans from January 1995 to December 2016. Rolling performance and risk measures are estimated using the Jensen’s (1966) 
approach. The dependent variable alpha is denoted on an annualized basis. Estimation of standard errors is heteroscedasticity consistent according to 
White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 5: Development of rolling 60-months alphas over time 
 
This figure shows the development of 60-months overlapping and rolling alphas for the time period 
from January 1995 to December 2016. 
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Figure 6: Development of $1 for different investments 
 
This figure shows the development for $1 invested in the ipath® S&P 500 BuyWrite ETN (BXM ETN), the PowerShares S&P 500 BuyWrite ETF (BXM ETF), the BXM 
and the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPDR ETF). The sample period for the BXM ETN spans from June 2007 to the end of December 2016 and the dataset for the BXM ETF 
starts in January 2008 ending in 2016. 
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Table 8         
Investments' performance          
         
 BXM ETF BXM ETN 
  net gross net gross 
Panel A: S&P 500 TR                 
Alpha -0.0178  -0.0103  -0.0104  -0.0029  
Beta 0.6694 *** 0.6698 *** 0.6784 *** 0.6788 *** 
R² 0.7987  0.7987  0.7976  0.7976  
         
Panel B: BXM                 
Alpha -0.0091 *** -0.0016 ** -0.0063 *** 0.0012 * 
Beta 1.0015 *** 1.0021 *** 1.0210 *** 1.0216 *** 
R² 0.9998  0.9998  0.9998  0.9998  
         
Panel C: SPDR ETF                 
Alpha -0.0175  -0.0100  -0.0100  -0.0025  
Beta 0.6748 *** 0.6752 *** 0.6837 *** 0.6841 *** 
R² 0.7960  0.7960  0.7948  0.7948  
         
Observations 108  108  115  115  
 
This table shows performance measures following Jensen (1968) for the PowerShares S&P 500 BuyWrite 
ETF (BXM ETF) as well as the ipath® S&P 500 BuyWrite ETN (BXM ETN). The sample period for the 
BXM ETF spans from January 2008 to the end of 2016 and the dataset for the BXM ETN starts in June 
2007 ending in December 2016. In Panel A: the market index used in performance regressions is the excess 
return of the S&P 500 total return index, in Panel B, the BXM serves as benchmark and in Panel C, the 
return of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPDR ETF) in excess of the risk-free rate is the market proxy. 
Performance in terms of alpha is denoted in absolute values p.a. Estimation of standard errors is 
heteroscedasticity consistent according to White (1980). ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated 
parameter at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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6 Conclusion 
This dissertation addresses important issues in mutual fund research related to different sources 
of non-linearities in fund returns. Specifically, such sources are inherent in instruments with 
non-linear payoff structures like derivatives and bonds. So far, only a few studies analyze how 
derivatives and other investment practices relate to mutual fund performance and risk. The first 
article therefore examines the benefits of option use on equity fund performance and risk. The 
main finding is that option users outperform nonusers at lower risk. The second article similarly 
examines the impact of complex investments on bond fund performance and risk; however, it 
comes to a different conclusion. Specifically, bond funds may employ interest rate futures to 
speculate on interest rate changes but they are not successful. 
Another source of non-linearities are bond returns itself. The third paper uncovers a systematic 
duration bias that occurs in previous performance measurement of bond mutual funds because 
state-of-the-art models ignore this non-linearity. Finally, combining questions regarding 
complex investments and non-linearity adjusted performance measurement, the fourth paper 
shows the complexity of portfolios containing options and revisits appropriate performance 
models. The main finding is that performance of option containing portfolios is highly sensitive 
to model choice and the analyzed time period. 
The findings in this thesis are novel and highly relevant for different groups of market 
participants and regulators. First, politicians and regulators, respectively, can use these insights 
for future legislation. The findings of this dissertation show the necessity of passing individual 
regulations for funds with different investment objectives rather than imposing them with 
standardized regulations in general. The reason for this claim is that complex investments and 
leverage generating instruments do not occur equally among different investment styles. They 
are much more common among bond funds than among equity funds. Moreover, most of the 
leverage generating instruments are not harmful for the fund universe but beneficial as it comes 
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to options among equity funds. A standardized regulation might harm not only equity but also 
bond funds, as they are reliant on these investments due to the highly competitive market and a 
discriminatory yield environment. Thus, individual regulation laws will appropriately consider 
the differing characteristics of diverse investment objective mutual funds and the differing 
effects of complex investments on their performance and risk. 
Second, the results of this thesis are relevant for investment decisions of both retail and 
institutional investors. Options in equity mutual funds can be beneficial for investors as option 
users generate an outperformance at lower systematic risk. Contrary to regulators’ concerns 
these funds do not employ these derivatives to speculate but rather to generate income that is 
directly passed to investors via higher risk-adjusted performance. When it comes to bond funds, 
however, investors should be aware that some complex investments are used to speculate and 
that these practices may diminish risk-adjusted performance and increase interest rate risk. 
Therefore, the outcomes facilitate investors’ decisions to invest in both equity as well as bond 
mutual funds. 
The duration bias illustrated in the third article is also relevant for regulators and investors at 
the same time. The evaluation of bond funds’ performance is severely affected by the choice of 
the benchmark. The approach proposed in the third paper helps assessing the performance of 
bond funds accurately. Hence, investors are saved from systematically overestimating 
performance and are consequently able to make right investment decisions. 
Lastly, investors that engage in option strategies can benefit from the findings of the fourth 
article. Assessing the performance of portfolios with option-like components is highly complex. 
Outperformance found by previous research is dependent on many factors such as time horizon 
and model choice. It can be shown that costs charged by investment providers consume eventual 
benefits generated by these strategies. 
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Beyond the results of this thesis, there are still research gaps to be closed. The insights presented 
in this dissertation enable other researchers to expand knowledge on complex investments 
among mutual funds. A relatively young field in mutual fund research is the examination of 
funds’ portfolio holdings, as started by Daniel et al. (1997). Further research might be able to 
detect long and short positions or the detailed type of complex investment. For example, 
researchers can deal with performance and risk of the derivative portfolio and the share of 
actuals in the same portfolio separately. Morningstar Direct’s database allows conclusions 
about the actual exposure arising from derivative securities that can help to judge hazards 
derivative securities may pose. On December 11 2015, the SEC released a proposal44 for further 
limiting mutual funds’ derivatives use and at the same time, Deli et al. (2015) published a white 
paper on this matter.45 
Furthermore, researchers can build on the findings of the last two papers. Results obtained from 
previous studies must be revisited with respect to biased performance measures. The approach 
to overcome the duration bias presented here can be translated to almost every question about 
bond fund performance to ascertain that this bias is not the main driver of the results. 
 
                                                 
44 https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/ic-31933.pdf 
45 https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/derivatives12-2015.pdf 
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